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Democracy in Ohio: Ohio's Fiscal
Constitution and the Unconstitutional
Nationwide Arena Deal
by DAVE EBERSOLE*
I. "Do you have any questions?"
Between September 2011 and March 2012 multiple public
institutions unanimously approved the public purchase of Nationwide
Arena in Columbus, Ohio (hereinafter the "Transaction").' The
Transaction is designed to save Columbus' National Hockey League
franchise, the Columbus Blue Jackets ("CBJ"), from moving to
another locality.! Through public testimony at Columbus City
Council and the Franklin County Convention Facilities Authority
("FCCFA"), as well as written correspondence with the Franklin
County Commissioners, I voiced public policy concerns regarding
democracy, public debt, economic development, and the
Transaction's legality under the Ohio Constitution. When I offered
to field questions following testimony before the Columbus City
Council and the FCCFA, each organization declined the invitation
and proceeded to unanimously approve the Transaction. Further,
* Member of the Ohio Bar. B.S. The Ohio State University; J.D. The Ohio State
University. All the views expressed here are my (the author's) own and do not represent
the views of any organization. All citing references are available upon request. Thanks to
Dale Oesterle for his helpful advice and comments on this article. All errors are my own.
1. Doug Caruso, Casino Tax-Financed Deal for Nationwide Arena Completed, THE
COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Mar. 29, 2012, http://www.dispatch.com/content/stories/locall
2012/03/29/arena-deal-closes.html.
2. Doug Caruso, Saving the Blue Jackets, THE COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Sept. 15,2011,
http://www.dispatch.com/content/stories/local/2011/09/15/saving-the-blue-jackets.html.
Following the Transaction's closing, Mayor Michael Coleman publicly suggested that
Columbus pursue an NBA franchise. Lucas Sullivan & Aaron Portzline, Coleman wants
NBA team to share Nationwide Arena with Blue Jackets, THE COLUMBUS DISPATCH, May
10, 2012, http://www.dispatch.com/content/stories/sports/2012/05/10/downtown-double-
team-coleman-seeks-nba-team-for-city.html.
3. Doug Caruso, Council approves casino money to buy Nationwide Arena, THE
COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Oct. 3, 2011, http://www.dispatch.com/content/stories/locall2011/
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my repeated requests to calculate the Transaction's return on
investment (a common metric for capital projects) went unanswered.'
The Transaction has widely applicable implications for public
finance in democratic institutions. Public officials' unanimous
support for the Transaction and their apparent disinterest in the
serious issues discussed in this article support a broader inference that
collective decision-making through elected representatives materially
affects public finance policy. As a result, the Transaction
demonstrates that nonelectoral fiscal restraints are needed in
constitutions.! Moreover, there are significant legal implications for
drafting and enforcing constitutional fiscal provisions, in part because
the Transaction does not comply with the Ohio Constitution.
Significantly, with certain adjustments, the Transaction could
have achieved technical compliance with the Ohio Constitution while
still frustrating the constitutional purpose. This circumstance raises
10/03/Council-shouted-down-during-casino-vote.html. ("But David Ebersole, an Ohio
State University law student, said the deal is too complex to be transparent and that it has
no hope of showing a return on investment"); Mandie Trimble, Nationwide Arena
Purchase Moves Forward, WOSU, (Oct. 18, 2012, 6:32 PM) ("Board members heard from
one public speaker, Dave Ebersole, who opposes to [sic] the arena purchase."),
http://beta.wosu.org/news/2011/10/18/cfa-board-members-ok-arena-purchase/. It should
be noted that Councilman Zach Klein abstained from the Oct. 3, 2012, Columbus City
Council vote because his law firm, Jones Day, was involved with the Transaction. One
FCCFA member also abstained from the Oct. 18,2012, FCCFA vote.
4. On multiple occasions, I asked the Transaction's proponents whether and how
they calculated return on investment, but I never received a meaningful response. See
Caruso, supra note 3; Trimble, supra note 3 (1 inquired about return on investment at City
Council and FCCFA meetings). When I wrote to the Franklin County Commissioners, in
part to question the Transaction's return on investment, Commissioner John O'Grady did
not calculate return on investment in his response letter. See Franklin County
Commissioner John O'Grady's cover letter to Peck, Shaffer, & Williams LLP, Letter
Dated November 14, 2011, attached as Exhibit B. Instead, Mr. O'Grady claimed that the
Transaction will "protect 10,000 jobs" and cited a report from the Ohio State John Glenn
School of Public Affairs, a report which ironically identifies return on investment as an
important metric for the Transaction and undermines any assertion that it is not necessary
to calculate return on investment for the Transaction. See discussion infra Pt. III(C).
5. GEOFFREY BRENNAN & JAMES M. BUCHANAN, 9 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF
JAMES M. BUCHANAN: THE POWER TO TAX: ANALYTICAL FOUNDATIONS OF A FISCAL
CONSTITUTION 9.1.18, 9.2.7 (1980), http://www.econlib.org/library/Buchanan/
buchCv9cl.html#Ch. 1, Taxation in Constitutional Perspective. "To a very substantial
extent, modern economists have implicitly accepted the prevailing twentieth-century
presumption (or faith?) that nominally democratic electoral processes are sufficient in
themselves to guarantee that government activity remains within acceptable limits." Id.
6. While I hesitate to contemplate circumventing the Ohio Constitution, the
Transaction could have been arranged in a manner to achieve technical legal compliance.
As written, the Transaction is funded with revenue bonds that are repaid only with casino
tax revenue. If, instead, the Transaction were financed with general obligation bonds, the
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the larger issue of how much leeway, if any, future interpreters should
allow in arranging public finances consistent with constitutional fiscal
restraints.! As a check on issues that arise in public finance due to
collective decision-making through elected representatives, courts
should honor the purposes behind constitutional fiscal provisions,
which are ratified directly by the people. In many instances
throughout U.S. history, however, courts have upheld complex
financial arrangements that frustrate the purposes behind state
constitutional fiscal provisions as technically compliant! While the
Transaction does not achieve technical compliance with the Ohio
Constitution, the Transaction does provide context for this article to
discuss issues regarding the economic purposes for fiscal restraints on
public finances and the policy rationale for placing these restraints in
state constitutions as directives from the people to their government.
II. Public Finance in Democracy
A. Public Finance in Democratic Institutions
Democratic constitutions, by their very nature, are designed to
limit the impact that individual self-interest has on the public
interest.'o Public investment, especially public investment in the
Transaction would likely be constitutional under the Ohio Constitution and related Ohio
Supreme Court precedent. See discussion infra Part IV(B)(3)(ii)(b).
7. See David Gold, Public Aid to Private Enterprise Under the Ohio Constitution, 16
U. TOL. L. REV. 405,406-07 (1985).
8. See id. at 407 ("Regardless of whether one adheres to the originalism or
adjudication as the proper method of constitutional decision-making, then, the first step
toward understanding a constitutional provision is discovering, as far as possible, the
intentions of the adopters.").
9. See Stewart E. Sterk & Elizabeth S. Goldman, Controlling Legislative
Shortsightedness: The Effectiveness of Constitutional Debt Limitations, 1991 WIS. L. REV.
1301, 1333-39 (1991); see e.g. Dale Oesterle, Lessons on the Limits of Constitutional
Language from Colorado: The Erosions of the Constitution's Ban on Business Subsidies, 73
U. COLO. L. REV. 587, 613-14 (2002).
10. John Stuart Mill, Ought Pledges to be Required from Members of Parliament?,
REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT (1861).
[Tlhe very simple principle of constitutional government requires it to
be assumed that political power will be abused to promote the
particular purpose of the holder; not because it is always so, but
because such is the natural tendency of things, to guard against which
is the especial use of free institutions.
Id. See also James Madison, THE FEDERALIST No. 51.
private sector, presents one circumstance in which many parties
influencing the public decision stand to individually gain,
economically and politically, from that decision." Moreover, these
incentives put decision-makers and other influential parties in
materially distinct positions from the general public because they
receive individual benefits separate and apart from the public
benefits. As a foundation, this section will explain the relevance of
individual economic and political incentives in public finance, and
identify incentives surrounding the Transaction.
1. Self-Interest or Benevolence: Are Individual Economic and Political
But the great security against a gradual concentration of the several
powers in the same department, consists in giving to those who
administer each department the necessary constitutional means and
personal motives to resist encroachments of the others. The provision
for defense must in this, as in all other cases, be made commensurate
to the danger of attack. Ambition must be made to counteract
ambition. The interest of the man must be connected with the
constitutional rights of the place. It may be a reflection on human
nature, that such devices should be necessary to control the abuses of
government. But what is government itself, but the greatest of all
reflections on human nature? If men were angels, no government
would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external
nor internal controls on government would be necessary. In framing a
government which is to be administered by men over men, the great
difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control
the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself. A
dependence on the people is, no doubt, the primary control on the
government; but experience has taught mankind the necessity of
auxiliary precautions.
Id. See also Alexander Hamilton, THE FEDERALIST No. 78.
A constitution is, in fact, and must be regarded by the judges, as a
fundamental law. It therefore belongs to them to ascertain its
meaning, as well as the meaning of any particular act proceeding from
the legislative body. If there should happen to be an irreconcilable
variance between the two, that which has the superior obligation and
validity ought, of course, to be preferred; or, in other words, the
Constitution ought to be preferred to the statute, the intention of the
people to the intention of their agents.
Id.
11. Gold, supra note 7, at 431 ("[Delegates to the 1873-74 Ohio constitutional
convention] complained of the corruption that invaded the political process when public
authorities parceled out railroad ."offices and contracts" and when private interests had a
direct financial stake in the outcome of elections.").
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Incentives Relevant?
Public investment presents unique individual economic and
political incentives that are particularly relevant to collective
decision-making through democratic institutions. To begin the
analysis, it is helpful to establish that most individuals (a term used
here to include the family unit) behave in their self-interest most of
the time." In fact, principles of market-based free enterprise and
private property rights reflect individual self-interest." Free
enterprise is based upon market participants behaving competitively,
14and in their own self-interest, to prosper. For instance, individuals
12. JAMES M. BUCHANAN AND GORDON TULLOCK, 3 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF
JAMES M. BUCHANAN: THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT: LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF A
CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 3.3.0, 3.3.2-3.3.4 (University of Michigan Press) (1962),
http://www.econlib.org/library/Buchanan/buchCv3.html. Human wants and desires, of
course, are heterogeneous and constantly changing such that it is impossible to
characterize how individual self-interest will drive conduct in every instance or in
situations subject to uncertain future circumstances. Frank Knight, Ethics and Economic
Interpretation, 36 QUARTERLY J. ECON. 454, 458-463 (May, 1922). But cultural norms
greatly affect human desires such that public policy can be developed with an
understanding that people will often behave in accordance with cultural norms. Frank
Knight, Ethics of Competition, 37 QUAR. J. ECON. 479, 480-84 (Aug., 1923) (hereinafter
"Knight 1I"); see FRANK KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY AND PROFIT 265 (1921) (reprint
of Sentry Press 1964) (hereinafter "Knight III") ("The higher up the scale we go, the
larger the proportion of the aesthetic element and of social suggestion there is involved in
motivation, the greater becomes the uncertainty connected with foreseeing wants and
satisfying them."), http://direct.mises.org/document/5150/Risk-Uncertainty-and-Profit. In
modern society, for example, many individuals are driven towards excelling in the free
enterprise system, often to accumulate wealth, consume goods or services, or attain social
status. Knight III, at 360; Knight II, at 602-05.
13. BUCHANAN & TULLOCK supra note 12, at 3.20.20. Private property rights are
based upon the principle that individuals will use their best judgment to address future
uncertainties when they reap benefits individually rather than collectively. Knight III,
supra note 12, at 351-61. To be sure, a system of private property rights and free enter-
prise is not perfect, but still better than any other. Knight III, supra note 12, at 374-75.
14. BUCHANAN & TULLOCK supra note 12, at 3.20.20; Knight III, supra note 12, at
358-60; Frank Easterbrook & Daniel Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's Management
in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161, 1165-74, 1176 (1981) ("The
standard economic assumption since Adam Smith introduced the invisible hand has been
that the firm's rational pursuit of its self-interest yields more gains for it than losses for its
rivals.") It should be noted that, while beyond the scope of this article, recent years have
renewed interest in the debate over the efficient capital markets hypothesis and
shareholder wealth maximization as the primary goal for firms. Compare George Dent,
The Essential Unity of Shareholders and the Myth of Short-Termism, 35 DEL. J. CORP. L.
97 (2010) with LYNN STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH: How PUTING
SHAREHOLDERS FIRST HARMS INVESTORS, CORPORATIONS, AND THE PUBLIC (Berrett-
Koehler Publishers 2012).
voluntarily enter into contracts because they expect to gain in some
way." Involuntary contracts, by contrast, are generally void.
This self-interest principle may be properly extended from the
market to the political context." To be sure, individuals sometimes
behave altruistically even when participating in a market economy."
Critics argue that politicians, in distinction to market participants,
play a benevolent role in which they pledge to put the "public good"
before their own self-interest." Democratic politicians, however,
simply cannot act completely independent of their self-interest.
To briefly digress, the public good is properly determined, at
least in part, as a procedural matter.o That is, legislation properly
enacted within constitutional limits, and judicially upheld as within
those limits if necessary, determines the public good.' Critics who
seek public good that is "found" must explain where it came from,
either from a source external to ourselves or through procedure (i.e.,
a contract theory).'
To the extent that procedure determines the public good,
whether in whole or in part, whether at the constitutional level or the
15. JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GEOFFREY BRENNAN, 10 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF
JAMES M. BUCHANAN: THE REASON OF RULES: CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICAL
ECONOMY 10.2,15-10.2.21. (Cambridge University Press) (1985), http://www.econlib.org/
library/Buchanan/buchCv10.html.
16. Frank Easterbrook & Daniel Fischel, Contractual Freedom In Corporate Law:
Articles & Comments; The Corporate Contract, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1416, 1428 (1989)
("Contract is a term for voluntary and unanimous agreement among affected parties."),
1436 ("The argument that contracts are optimal applies only if the contracting parties bear
the full costs of their decisions and reap all the gains.").
17. BUCHANAN & BRENNAN, supra note 15, at 10.3.16-10.3.18; BUCHANAN &
TULLOCK, supra note 12, at 3.20.7-3.20.8. But see Daniel Shaviro, Beyond Public Choice
and Public Interest: A Study of the Legislative Process and Illustrated by Tax Legislation in
the 1980s, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 65-68 (1990) (refuting the analogy between individual self-
interest in free markets and political self-interest in democratic institutions).
18. BUCHANAN & BRENNAN, supra note 15, at 10.3.16-10.3.18; BUCHANAN &
TULLOCK, supra note 12, at 3.3.2-3.3.4.
19. BUCHANAN & BRENNAN, supra note 15, at 10.3.16-10.3.18.
20. BUCHANAN & TULLOCK, supra note 12, at 3.2.4; BUCHANAN & BRENNAN, supra
note 15, at 10.3.16-10.3.18. For the purposes here, it need only be established that
procedure plays at least some role in determining the "public good." I (the author) do not
advocate either a completely contractarian or anti-contractarian constitutional position as
that issue is beyond the scope of this writing. See generally BUCHANAN & BRENNAN,
supra note 15, at Ch. 2 ("The Contractarian Vision") and Ch. 3 ("The Myth of
Benevolence"). In addition to these positions, there may be a middle ground in which
external influences have a constitutional effect and procedure (contract theory) is the
driving force at the post-constitutional decision-making level. Id at 10.2.6.
21. BUCHANAN & TULLOCK, supra note 12, at 3.1.6, 3.4.1-3.4.4.
22. BUCHANAN & BRENNAN, supra note 15, at 10.3.23.
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post-constitutional decision-making level, politicians must act upon
their internal dictates. Politicians in their collective capacity are the
procedure that determines the public good such that any arguments
that individual politicians independently determine and seek the
public good presuppose that there is a public good completely
external to the process. 3 These critics, then, underestimate the role
of procedure in determining the public good. In other words,
politicians cannot be completely benevolent because they cannot
independently determine the actions or positions that benevolence
24
supports.
Identifying the democratic politician as self-interested is not
intended to condemn politicians." Rather, the purpose here is to
establish that our democratic institutions are imperfect and that
individual economic and political incentives are relevant to discourse
about public finance. These incentives influence politicians and other
decision makers, even if the extent of that influence is indeterminate
and varying in scope from politician to politician and case to case.26
2. The Transaction's Individual Economic and Political Incentives
As is often the case with public investment in the private sector,
individuals holding influence over the Transaction have economic and
political incentives separate and apart from the general public." To
understand these incentives, it will be necessary first to provide
historical context regarding CBJ.
23. Id. at 10.3.16-10.3.18; BUCHANAN & TULLOCK supra note 12, at 3.14.7
("independent criterion for determining the appropriate allocation of resources between
the public sector and the private sector does not exist").
24. BUCHANAN & BRENNAN, supra note 15, at 10.3.19.
25. BRENNAN & BUCHANAN, supra note 5, at 9.1.15-9.1.16 ("The logic of
constitutional restrictions is embodied in the implicit prediction that any power assigned to
government may be, over some ranges and on some occasions, exercised in ways that are
at variance with the desired usage of such power, as defined by citizens behind the veil of
ignorance.").
26. See e.g. JAMES BUCHANAN & RICHARD WAGNER, 8 THE COLLECED WORKS
OF JAMES M. BUCHANAN: DEMOCRACY IN DEFICIT: THE POLITICAL LEGACY OF LORD
KEYNES 8.4.34 (Academic Press Inc.) (1977), http://www.econlib.org/library/
BuchananfbuchCv8.html. Although these incentives often involve conflicts of interest, in
some instances these incentives can play a positive role. For example, campaign
contributions to a candidate who advocates a particular position may assist constituents in
communicating with their representatives.
27. See Gold, supra note 7, at 431.
a. John H. McConnell Brings Professional Hockey to Columbus
On or about November 1996, Columbus Hockey Limited
("CHL"), an Ohio LLC, applied for an NHL franchise on behalf of
the City of Columbus.28 CHL included several prominent local
entrepreneurs including John H. McConnell, Lamar Hunt, John
Wolfe and Ronald Pizzuti.9 John Wolfe is the chairman, publisher
and CEO of the Columbus Dispatch Printing Co. ("The Dispatch").0
To obtain an NHL franchise, Columbus first needed to secure
funding for a sports arena." A May 1997 ballot proposal for a sales
tax increase to fund a publicly owned arena for the hockey franchise
failed, as did four previous ballot proposals for a sports arena.32 Local
leaders then turned to Nationwide Insurance Enterprise
("Nationwide"), a prominent insurance company with its world
headquarters in Columbus, to privately finance a new sports arena.33
However, following a series of negotiations, Nationwide and Hunt
Sports Group, led by Lamar Hunt, could not reach an agreement on
lease terms.34
Following initial negotiations, John H. McConnell assured the
NHL that he would lease the arena and purchase the franchise even if
Hunt and Nationwide could not reach an agreement on lease terms.
Sure enough, because Hunt believed that an NHL team would lose
millions under the deal, he was unable to reach a lease agreement
with Nationwide.3 ' Led by John H. McConnell, CHL members
including John Wolfe and Ronald Pizzuti then broke away from CHL
28. McConnell v. Hunt Sports, 132 Ohio App. 3d 657, 668 (1999). The NHL had
previously indicated that it was seeking to expand. Id.
29. Id. at 667 ("The members of CHL were McConnell, Wolfe Enterprises, Inc.,
Hunt Sports Group, Pizzuti Sports Limited, and Buckeye Hockey, L.L.C"). Ameritech
was also included in the group. Id. at 671. John Wolfe is the Chairman and CEO of The
Columbus Dispatch Printing Co. John H. McConnell is the founder of Worthington
Industries Inc., a prominent metal manufacturing company headquartered in Columbus,
Ohio.
30. Jeff Bell, Businessperson of the Year: John F. Wolfe, Dispatch Printing Co.,
COLUMBUS BUSINESS FIRST, Dec. 30, 2011, http://www.bizjournals.com/columbus/print-
edition/2011/12/30/businessperson-of-the-year-john.html?page=all.
31. McConnell, 132 Ohio App. at 668.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. Hunt Sports Group owned Columbus' Major League Soccer franchise, the
Columbus Crew. Id. at 667.
35. Id. at 668.
36. Id. ("Again, Hunt Sports Group indicated that the lease proposal was
unacceptable and that the NHL team would lose millions with this proposal.").
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and formed a new group to lease the arena and secure the franchise."
Other CHL members stated that they found the lease terms to be
unacceptable and did not join McConnell's group." Indeed,
McConnell's group was able to reach a lease agreement and secure
the NHL franchise that became CBJ." The final barrier to an NHL
franchise in Columbus, litigation between Hunt and McConnell's
group, was decided in favor of McConnell's group.40 To be sure,
before Columbus even secured an NHL franchise, there were serious
questions about the franchise's viability raised during the Hunt
negotiations and through voter disapproval for a sports arena.
b. Professional Hockey, Casino Gambling and the Local Media
As early as 2008, John P. McConnell, CBJ majority owner and
the son of John H. McConnell, suggested that CBJ might move away
from Columbus due to the team's financial troubles.41 In 2009, CBJ
CEO Michael Priest stated that CBJ had lost $80 million over the
prior seven years.42 CBJ has since stated that it lost $25 million in
37. Id. at 669. McConnell's group breaking away from CHL led to the litigation
regarding, among other issues, fiduciary duties in the CHL operating agreement.
38. Id. at 669-70. Ameritech and Buckeye Hockey, LLC were the other CHL
members that agreed with Hunt. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 703 ("In summary, appellant's [Hunt Sports Enterprises'] first, second,
third, fourth, and fifth assignments of error are overruled.").
41. Aaron Portzline, Heir's presence to be less apparent, THE COLUMBUS DISPATCH,
Aug. 24, 2008, http://www.dispatch.com/content/stories/sports/2008/08/24/jackets24.ART
ART 08-24-08_C1_DPB4D5V.html. John P. McConnell stated the following:
I can tell them that we bought the team to have it here in Columbus.
We're dedicated to keeping it in Columbus. But I can't offer
guarantees. I am reasonably comfortable that we'll be here for a long
time. Certainly, every fiber of what we try to do is to fulfill that
original thought. My father worked on various sports commissions for
probably 35 years to get a pro team for this town. It was one of his
dreams.
Id.
42. Jeff Bell, Blue Jackets waive white flag on sin tax bid for Nationwide Arena,
COLUMBUS BUSINESS FIRST, June 2, 2009, http://www.bizjournals.com/columbus/
stories/2009/06/01/daily22.html?page=all; Stephen Buser, Emeritus Professor of Finance,
The Ohio State University, Report on the Blue Jackets, at 9, Nov. 5 2009 ("financial
statements prepared by the Blue Jackets indicate that financial losses based on standard
accounting measures were in the range of $12.9 million to $16.6 million in 2006, $5.5
million to $9.9 million in 2007, $12 million to $16.5 million in 2008 and $12 million to $15
million in 2009"), on file with the author. Professor Buser is a proponent of the Arena
Deal. Steph Greegor, Oh, the irony, Casino dollars proposed to save the Arena district
2010-11 alone.43 In short order, Lamar Hunt's predictions about a
Columbus NHL franchise losing millions under Nationwide's lease
terms had unfortunately come to pass." CBJ's initial attempt to
obtain public financial support for the team was unsuccessful when a
CBJ-led attempt to subsidize CBJ with a county sin tax for alcohol
and tobacco sales failed in 2009.
As CBJ was experiencing financial difficulties, Ohio was also
considering a constitutional amendment to authorize casino gambling
amid an economic downturn. During the public debate over the
casino amendment, CBJ minority-owner, The Dispatch, strongly
opposed the amendment in an editorial.4 6 The Dispatch argued that
the casino amendment was too lengthy and that a more appropriate
amendment would delegate implementation to the Ohio General
Assembly via its statutory authority. Nonetheless, in November
2009, Ohio voters approved an Ohio constitutional amendment to
authorize four casinos in Ohio.' The casino was unpopular, however,
in Franklin County (where Columbus is located), with 58% of voters
voting against the casino amendment."
THE OTHER PAPER, Sept. 15, 2011 (quoting Stephen Buser: "They put together just a
fantastic deal."), http://www.theotherpaper.cominews/articlebcd4a9be-dfb7-11eO-9c44-
001cc4cOO2e.html.
43. Joe Yerdon, Report: Blue Jackets Lost $25 million last season; $80M over six years,
NBCSPORTS (May 11, 2011, 11:28 AM), http://prohockeytalk.nbcsports.com/201l/
05/11/blue-jackets-report-they-lost-25-million-last-season-80-million-over-six-years/; Dave
Ghose, Saving the Blue Jackets, COLUMBUS MONTHLY, Feb. 2012,
http://www.columbusmonthly.com/February-2012/Saving-the-Blue-Jackets/; see also
Caruso, supra note 2 ("The Blue Jackets have said they are losing $10 million to $12
million per year on their lease deal with Nationwide.").
44. McConnell, 132 Ohio App. at 668.
45. Bell, supra note 42.
46. In an editorial, The Dispatch argued that the casino amendment was too detailed
and rigid, and that a better amendment would delegate implementation to the Ohio
General Assembly. Editorial: No on State Issue 3, THE COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Oct. 12,
2009, http://www.dispatch.comlcontent/stories/editorials/2009/10/11/NOCAS.ARTART
10-11-09_G4_O5FAO6D.html. A competing media outlet, The Other Paper, contended
that The Dispatch disapproved of the casino amendment to protect its business interest in
the Arena District.
47. Id.
48. OHIO CONST. art. XV §6(c); OHIO ISSUES REPORT: STATE ISSUE BALLOT
INFORMATION FOR THE NOVEMBER 3, 2009 GENERAL ELECTION (2009),
http://www.sos.state.oh.us/sos/upload/publications/electionlIssues 09.pdf.
49. Franklin County Board of Elections, General Election: Franklin County, Ohio,
Nov. 9, 2009, FRANKLIN COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS 1, 10 (2009), at 10,
http://vote.franklincountyohio.gov/assets/pdf/2009/general/Official-Franklin-County-Only-
Results.PDF.
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Just three weeks following the November 2009 election in which
Ohio voters approved casino gambling, Ohio legislators introduced a
constitutional amendment to move the original site for the Columbus
casino.o The amendment asked voters statewide whether the
Columbus casino should be moved from the Arena District where
CBJ plays to Columbus' near west side." Significantly, The Dispatch
owns 20% of the property in the Arena District.52 Due to The
Dispatch's business interest in the Arena District, the company set to
construct and operate the Columbus casino, Penn National Gaming
Inc., would later suggest that The Dispatch promoted the move to
protect its business interest." Similarly, competing media outlets
identified The Dispatch's conflict of interest in reporting on a story in
which it had business interests. 4
50. Franklin County Legislators Propose May 2010 Ballot Issue To Give Cities Casino
Opt-Out, GONGWER OHIO (Nov. 24, 2009), http://www.gongwer-oh.com.
51. House Sends Casino Relocation Plan To Ballot, Rejects Cutbacks To Third
Frontier, GONGWER OHIO (Jan. 27,2010), http://www.gongwer-oh.com.
52. A Dispatch affiliate, Capitol Square Ltd., an Ohio LLC, holds a 20% ownership
stake in Columbus' Arena District. Benjamin J. Marrison, Sinister? No. Errors?
Sometimes, THE COLUMBUS DISPATCH, July 26, 2011, http://www.dispatch.com/content/
stories/insight/2011/04/24/sinister-no--errors-sometimes.html. Although Capital Square
Ltd. is a privately held entity that need not disclose its property holdings, The Dispatch
reports about Capitol Square's interest are presumably reliable because they may amount
to an admission against interest in this context.
53. A Penn National subsidiary, CD Gaming Ventures LLC, identified this interest in
a federal court filing. First Amended Complaint for Injunctive Relief, Damages and
Declaratory Relief, CD Gaming Ventures LLC v. City of Columbus et al., No. 2:11-CV-
216 (S.D. Ohio 2011) at 10.
Shortly after passage of the Amendment, and notwithstanding the
clear mandate of the citizens of Ohio, Columbus 'business interests,'
including owners of land in the Arena District area such as The
Dispatch Printing Company, which is controlled by the Wolfe family
and owns The Columbus Dispatch newspaper and twenty percent of
the Arena District development, notified Penn that they opposed the
development of a casino on the Arena District Land and would do
everything in their power to thwart development of a casino on the
Arena District Land.
Id. Notwithstanding Penn National's assertion, a casino in the Arena District could
conceivably benefit The Dispatch's interest in the Arena District with additional business
activity.
54. Doug Caruso, Suit asks court to force casino-site annexation, THE COLUMBUS
DISPATCH, Mar. 10, 2011, http://www.dispatch.com/content/stories/local/2011/03/10/suit-
asks-court-to-force-casino-site-annexation.html.
Indeed, Columbus' major business interests, including The
Dispatch, organized a group that led the public campaign to build
voter support to move the casino." In conjunction with The Dispatch-
led public campaign, a Dispatch executive was publicly outspoken
about endorsing the relocation amendment." The Dispatch also
endorsed the casino relocation amendment in an editorial." Penn
National even invested two million dollars to support the campaign
for the relocation amendment, purportedly because it believed that
the City of Columbus would compensate it for relocation costs and
environmental clean-up at the new casino site.8
It should be obvious at this point to any thinking person that The
Dispatch has gone far beyond any definition of journalistic integrity
and has simply decided that, instead of reporting the news, it intends
to create its own news to reflect its owners' personal opinions,' said
Bob Tenenbaum, a spokesman for Penn National.
Id.; Jeff Bell, Pitch for Issue 2 ready to hit state airwaves, COLUMBUS BUSINESS FIRST,
Apr. 12, 2010 (quoting an Ohio lobbyist who identifies local business interests in moving
the casino out of the Arena District or, alternatively, defeating casino gambling in Ohio
altogether), http://www.bizioumals.com/columbus/stories/2010/04/12/story
4 .html?page= 3 ;
Steph Greegor, All In: The Dispatch Co. filed a counterclaim demanding that Penn
National annex its proposed casino into Columbus. Wasn't that the city's fight?, THE
OTHER PAPER, Mar. 24, 2011 ("Tompkins said it's also completely legit to 'editorialize' an
opinion, which the Dispatch has done often throughout the casino process, rallying
strongly against state Issue 3 that legalized casino gambling in 2009."),
http://www.theotherpaper.com/news/articlefabebfd2-5626-lleO-9ef3-olcc4cOO2eO.html.
But see Bell supra note 30. Penn National accused The Dispatch of promoting its
"business and political agenda," but John Wolfe stated the following:
It was not about Penn National or about gambling,' he said. 'It was an
issue of maintaining an annexation policy that has benefited this city
for decades ... I can tell you our ownership in the Arena District had
no bearing whatsoever on our editorial position or [our thinkingi that
the casino needed another location and needed to annex to Columbus.
Id.
55. Lyndsey Teter, Who is Stand Up Columbus?, THE OTHER PAPER, June 9, 2011
(noting that Dispatch executive Mike Curtain was a leading figure in the organized effort
to pass the casino relocation amendment), http://www.theotherpaper.com/news/article
319ab240-56a4-5139-b5b3-ecd7bc43al7l.html.
56. Jeff Bell, Casino critic pleased with progress, so far, COLUMBUS BUSINESS FIRST,
Mar. 1, 2010, http://www.bizjournals.com/columbus/stories/2010/03/01/story7.html?
surround=etf&ana=e-article.
57. Dispatch endorsement: For State Issue 2, THE COLUMBUS DISPATCH, May 28,
2010, http://www.dispatch.com/content/stories/editorials/2010/03/28/for-state-issue-2.html.
58. The Dispatch averred that it campaigned with Penn National for the casino
relocation amendment, and Penn National has not publicly refuted this claim. Answer,
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Organized and influential opposition to the amendment never
developed." Proponents for the relocation amendment argued that
the Arena District did not have the infrastructure to handle
additional economic activity and that the move would assist economic
development at the new site.' Some even viewed the move as an
alternative to defeating casino gambling in Columbus after local
voters had rejected the statewide ballot measure in 2009." In a
statewide vote in May 2010, Ohio voters overwhelmingly approved
the constitutional amendment that moved the casino originally set for
Columbus to an area just outside Columbus."
Meanwhile, the Columbus Chamber of Commerce commissioned
a study late in 2009 to determine CBJ's economic impact on the
region. Contrary to unbiased academic studies during the 2004-05
NHL lockout finding that NHL teams have a minimal impact on city
economies other than to shift the location of economic activity within
NHL cities,' the Columbus Chamber report determined that
Counterclaim and Cross-claim of Intervening Defendant the Dispatch Printing Company,
Central Ohio Gaming Ventures LLC v. Goodman et al., Case No. 11CVH-2850 (Franklin
County Court of Common Pleas 2011), at 8 ("The Dispatch entered into a 50/50 joint
effort with Penn to contribute $4 million to support Issue 2.").
59. See Ohio Prosperity Project, 2010 Primary Election (noting that there was no
organized opposition to the 2010 casino relocation amendment), http:/lwww.bipac.net/
page.asp?content=2010_StateBallotIssues&g=OHIO.
60. Bell, supra note 56; House Panel Advances Columbus Casino Relocation Plan,
GONGWER OHIO (Jan. 21, 2010), http://www.gongwer-oh.com.
61. Bell, supra note 56; House Panel Advances Columbus Casino Relocation Plan,
GONGWER OHIO (Jan. 21, 2010), http://www.gongwer-oh.com.
62. Proposed Constitutional Amendment to Change the Location of the Columbus
Casino Facility Authorized by Previous Statewide Vote, CLEVELAND-MARSHALL
COLLEGE OF THE LAW (May 4, 2010), https://www.law.csuohio.edu/sites/default/files/
lawlibrary/ohioconlaw/Issue2FinalLanguage.000.pdf.
63. Doug Caruso, What economy does arena boost?, THE COLUMBUS DISPATCH,
Sept. 26, 2011 (citing economic reports), http://www.dispatch.com/content/stories/local
2011/09/26/whateconomydoesarenaboost.html. See also Dennis Coates & Brad
Humphreys, Do Economists Reach a Conclusion on Subsidies for Sports Franchises,
Stadiums, and Mega-Events? (Int'l Ass'n of Sports Economists, Working Paper Series,
Paper No. 08-18, 2008).
Abstract: This paper reviews the empirical literature assessing the
effects of subsidies for professional sports franchises and facilities. The
evidence reveals a great deal of consistency among economists doing
research in this area. That evidence is that sports subsidies cannot be
justified on the grounds of local economic development, income
growth or job creation, those arguments most frequently used by
subsidy advocates.
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
Columbus would suffer a severe negative economic impact if CBJ
relocated to another locality.6 Shortly after the Chamber report was
released, Columbus hired attorney John Rosenberger to reach "a
deal" between CBJ, Nationwide and public officials, which would
later become the Transaction for the public purchase of Nationwide
Arena.5 Once voters approved the casino amendment, casino tax
Id.; see also Brent Bordson, Public Sports Stadium Funding: Communities Being Held
Hostage By Professional Sports Team Owners, 21 HAMLINE L. REv. 505,507 n. 20 (1998).
Bordson cites the following authorities:
See Jim McCartney, Study: The Twins Can Go South and Economy
Won't Follow: Report Claims Teams Have a Negative Effect on Local
Income Levels, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS, Oct. 26, 1997, at Al.
Dennis Coates, the author of a recent unpublished study on the impact
of sports teams on local economies, commented on the proposals
considered by the Legislature to build a new stadium for the
Minnesota Twins by saying, 'in general, you'd be better off to tell them
to go to hell.' Id. Coates' study examined 37 metropolitan areas over
the last 26 years, and concluded that sports teams' average annual cost
was about $ 400 per person. See id. * * * The new Arizona baseball
stadium for the Diamondbacks is expected to create 400 permanent
jobs. See id. However, with the cost of the stadium estimated at $ 280
million, the actual cost per job created is $ 700,000. See id. In
Cleveland, the cost per job created from the new basketball arena and
baseball stadium was $ 231,000 for each of the new 1,250 jobs created,
and a recent proposal to build a new $ 800 million baseball stadium for
the New York Yankees would cost $ 1.82 million per job for each of
the 440 permanent jobs that would be created. See id.
Id.
64. Buser, supra note 42, at 7.
To appreciate the sensitivity of economic forecasts to the retention of
the Blue Jackets, one need only consider the devastating, but
fortunately temporary, effect on businesses in the Arena District
during the period of suspended NHL games in late 2004 and early
2005. The Columbus Dispatch published a series of stories detailing
the negative impact not only on businesses in the Arena District but
also for businesses in adjacent areas and even some businesses in
outlying areas. The impact was especially severe in the Arena District.
As a result, a major owner of business property in the District,
Nationwide Realty, was forced to reduce lease charges by a factor of
50% during the period of suspended NHL play.
Id. The Buser report accurately noted that it is unusual for an NHL team to play in a
privately owned arena. Id. at 7-8.
65. See Charlie Boss, Robert Vitale & Tom Reed, Jackets fans fight for hockey: Amid
turmoil on the ice and behind the bench, the Jackets get support for lease modification, THE
COLUMBus DISPATCH, Feb. 5, 2010 http://www.dispatch.com/content/storieslocal/2010/
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revenue was slated for Columbus and Franklin County coffers, and
City officials began contemplating casino tax revenue as a funding
source to subsidize CBJ.6
But with the move outside the Columbus city limits, Columbus
needed to annex at the new Columbus casino site in order to
maximize its share of casino tax revenue under the Ohio
Constitution." In exchange for annexing the new casino site, Penn
National expected Columbus to provide tax incentives to compensate
it for the land it owned at the original casino site and other relocation
costs.' When Columbus refused to compensate Penn National for
the relocation costs, Penn National balked at annexing the casino site
to Columbus.'
In response, Columbus accused Penn National of reneging on a
promise to annex the land and proceeded to withhold water and
sewer service to the casino site until annexation.70 An Ohio state
02/05/Blue_Jackets.ARTART_02-05-10_Al_9TGGN10.html. Mr. Rosenberger was paid
$38,000 under his original contract. Id.
66. Proponents of the Transaction first publicly mentioned casino tax revenue as a
funding source for subsidizing the Blue Jackets in July 2010. See, e.g., Jeff Bell, Can casino
tax windfall save Blue Jackets?, COLUMBUS BUSINESS FIRST, July 19, 2010,
http://www.bizjournals.com/columbus/stories/2010/07/19/story2.html?page=all. The
Hollywood Casino in Columbus opened to the public on October 8, 2012. Steve
Wartenberg, Casino era begins, THE COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Oct. 9, 2012,
http://www.dispatch.comlcontent/stories/local/2012/10/09/casino-era-begins.html.
67. OHIO CONST. art. XV, §6(C)(3)(c) ("Five percent of the tax on gross casino
revenue shall be distributed to the host city where the casino facility that generated such
gross casino revenue is located."); Doug Caruso, Casino can't reach annexation deal by
deadline, THE COLUMBUS DISPATCH, July 20, 2011, (noting that Columbus would lose
millions in casino tax revenue as well as income tax revenue from casino workers if the
casino were not annexed to Columbus), http://www.dispatch.com/content/stories/local/
2011/07/20/casino-cant-reach-deal-by-deadline.html.
68. See Dave Davis, Columbus casino moves forward despite questions over water and
sewer, THE PLAIN DEALER, Apr. 25, 2011, ("[Penn National states] they've lost $30
million on the Arena District property, and that elected officials and business executives
promised they'd help soften the financial blow caused by moving."),
http://blog.cleveland.com/metro/2011/04/columbus casinomoves_forward.html.
69. Penn National sues Columbus as casino annexation fight escalates, COLUMBUS
BUSINESS FIRST, Mar. 11, 2011, http://www.bizjournals.com/columbus/news/2011/
03/11/penn-national-sues-columbus-as-casino.html; Lyndsey Teter, Wish them well, THE
OTHER PAPER, Dec. 2, 2010, http://www.theotherpaper.com/news/article 4570881c-2c9b-
56b2-8cf0-4643dad4e4a2.html.
70. Columbus and Franklin County passed legislation denying sewer service to the
casino site. City of Columbus Ordinance No. 1824-2010; County of Franklin Resolution
No. 0989-10; First Amended Complaint of CD Gaming Ventures LLC supra note 53, at
18-19. Columbus argued that it had a policy not to provide water and sewer service to
property outside city limits without first requiring annexation, while Penn National sought
to enforce a prior contract regarding sewer lines and also to drill water well(s) on the land.
senator even suggested a constitutional amendment allowing Franklin
County voters to opt out of the original casino amendment." Penn
National then accused Columbus of reneging on a promise to provide
financial assistance and filed a lawsuit to compel Columbus and
Franklin County to provide sewer and water service to the new casino
site.72 In a surprising twist, an affiliate of The Dispatch purchased a
vacant lot adjacent to the casino site to provide legal standing to
challenge Penn National's zoning application for the land and bring
legal claims against Penn National regarding its sewage
management.73 In the suit, The Dispatch sought to force annexation
Elizabeth Gibson, County signs off on city water deal: Casino related pact allows access-
minus annexation, THE COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Dec. 15, 2010 ("Columbus policy has been
to require annexation into the city before extending water and sewer services to
unincorporated pockets of the county."); see also Jeff Bell, Penn National begins work on
Columbus casino, sewer deal or no sewer deal, COLUMBUS BUSINESS FIRST, Apr. 25, 2011,
http://www.bizjournals.com/columbus/blog/2011/04/penn-national-begins-work-on-
columbus.html.
71. James Nash, Effort to move casino begins, THE COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Dec. 10,
2009 (According to State Senator David Goodman, "The General Assembly could put a
measure on the May 2010 ballot that would allow Franklin County to opt out of the voter-
approved constitutional amendment allowing casinos in four cities."); Committee Opens
Hearings On Variety Of Casino Legislation, GONGWER OHIO (Dec. 9, 2009),
http://www.gongwer-oh.com.
72. First Amended Complaint of CD Gaming Ventures LLCsupra note 53, at 12.
The City asked CDG to submit to annexation of the Delphi Land so
that the City could again lay claim to tens of millions of dollars a year
from the 'host city tax' and other tax revenue associated with the
operation of the casino in Columbus. CDG agreed to explore
annexation of the property into the City based on the City's assurances
that it would execute a development agreement with CDG that would
include substantial financial incentives. Additionally, the City agreed
to assist Penn by locating a buyer who would make an acceptable offer
for the Arena District Land. These two promises by the City were
intended to allow Penn to recapture its significant loss as a result of
relocation.
Id. See also id., at 14 ("However, the City reneged on these promises."); see also Caruso
supra note 67.
73. Jeff Bell, Dispatch-Penn National fight raises ethics debate, COLUMBUS BUSINESS
FIRST, Apr. 28, 2011, http://www.bizjournals.com/columbus/blog/2011/04/dispatch-penn-
national-conflict-gives.html?page=all; Steph Greegor, Playground Bully, THE OTHER
PAPER, July 21, 2011, http://www.theotherpaper.com/news/article_816b9f68-719e-lleO-
93d4-001cc4c03286.html.
Only a "Machiavellian," mind-the word Penn vice president Eric
Schippers used in March to describe The Dispatch's actions, would
think 10 steps ahead of its enemy to thwart future actions. Like, for
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and halt casino construction until the land was connected to sewer
and water lines.'
While The Dispatch's business interest in the Arena District had
been identified earlier," scrutiny intensified during the public fight
between The Dispatch and Penn National." Competing media
outlets, one of which The Dispatch acquired later in 2011, questioned
whether it was ethical for The Dispatch to report on a matter where
it's parent company had a pecuniary business interest, publicly
protested its position and was a party to related litigation.'
Moreover, as City officials were contemplating using tax revenue for
CBJ during the annexation dispute,' The Dispatch, as CBJ equity
holder, had an interest in annexing the casino site without tax
incentives insomuch as that tax revenue was otherwise slated to
subsidize CBJ.79
While a preliminary resolution was announced in July 2011, just
two months before the Transaction was announced in September
2011, the litigation involving Columbus, CBJ, The Dispatch and Penn
National was not finally resolved until November 2011." Ultimately,
the parties made the following concessions: Penn National agreed to
annex the land; Columbus agreed to provide sewer and water service
example, knowing that Penn National would be applying for a zoning
certificate from Franklin County come April, then knowing that only
adjacent property owners could object to that zoning certificate
application, and then, say, hunting down a property that met that
specification and buying it under the auspice of a newly formed
business entity-Strata 33 Investments-in March so that when Penn
National filed that zoning application, they could file their objection
just two days later.
Id.
74. First Amended Complaint of CD Gaming Ventures LLC, supra note 53, at 28-29.
See also Caruso, supra note 54.
75. Bell, supra note 54 (quoting an Ohio lobbyist who identifies local business
interests in moving the casino out of the Arena District or, alternatively, defeating casino
gambling in Ohio altogether).
76. Bell, supra note 73; Marrison, supra note 52.
77. Bell, supra note 73; Greegor, supra note 73; Greegor, supra note 54.
78. Bell, supra note 66.
79. See Ghose, supra note 43 ("Though they weren't talking about it, city officials
needed to end the annexation dispute to make progress in the Blue Jackets rescue plan.").
80. Doug Caruso, Casino annexation Complete Tonight, THE COLUMBUS DISPATCH,
Nov. 7, 2011, http://www.dispatch.com/content/blogs/the-city/2011/11/casinoannexation
html. See also Penn National Casino Dispute Ends; Nationwide buying Arena District
Land, COLUMBus BUSINESS FIRST, July 22, 2011, http://www.bizjournals.com/columbus/
morningcall/2011/07/penn-national-moving-ahead-after.html.
and make road and environmental improvements to the casino
property; The Dispatch agreed to drop its litigation against Penn
National; and Nationwide agreed to purchase the land in the Arena
District at the original casino site." With the new casino site
successfully annexed to Columbus, Columbus received millions of
dollars in additional casino tax revenue under the Ohio Constitution,
which allowed the Transaction to proceed.82
In the latest development, as this article is going to print, the
NHL is in the midst of a lockout and it is questionable whether and to
what extent CBJ will play hockey during the 2012-13 NHL season.
The lockout also threatens to cancel the 2013 NHL All-Star game,
which is scheduled to be played in Nationwide Arena.'
c. Parties Benefitting From the Transaction
Several parties standing to individually gain from the
Transaction, including private parties who negotiated CBJ's original
private lease, publicly sought to influence the current public
Transaction as a matter of public interest through the Greater
Columbus Sports Commission ("GCSC").8 ' The GCSC has a mission
81. COLUMBUS BUSINESS FIRST, supra note 80; Lyndsey Teter, The Dispatch vs. the
casino - still, THE OTHER PAPER, July 21, 2011, http:/www.theotherpaper.com/news/
articlec4eb2100-92b4-1 1e0-b5a5-001cc4c03286.html.
82. Documents filed in federal court estimated the annual "host city" bonus casino
tax revenue that Columbus would receive under OHIO CONST. art. XV §6(3)(c)(3) as $9.5
million, which is the same amount that officials estimated the Transaction would save CBJ
annually. Compare First Amended Complaint of CD Gaming Ventures LLC supra note
53, at 28 (estimating that Columbus will receive $9.5 million annually as host city of the
Columbus Casino if the casino site is annexed to Columbus) with Caruso supra note 2
(estimating that the Transaction will save CBJ $9.5 million annually). The Dispatch also
moved to protect John Wolfe from discussing "financial matters regarding the Columbus
Blue Jackets." Memorandum in Support of Motion for Non-Party John Wolfe for
Protective Order, at 5. See discussion infra Part IV for a detailed discussion of the
Transaction and related legal analysis.
83. Josh Jarman, Franklin County taxpayers have little on the line in hockey lockout,
THE COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Sept. 19, 2012, http://www.dispatch.com/content/stories/
local/2012/09/19/whats-the-impact.html; Jeff Bell, NHL lockout to keep Nationwide Arena
dark but public won't be burned, COLUMBUS BUSINESS FIRST, Sept. 21, 2012,
http://www.bizjournals.com/columbus/print-edition/2012/09/21/nhl-lockout-to-keep-
nationwide-arena.html?page=all.
84. Jeff Bell, Last Chance for NHL All-Star Game seen in latest labor talks,
COLUMBUS BUSINESS FIRST, Nov. 6, 2012, http://www.bizjournals.com/columbus/blog/
2012/11/last-chance-for-nhl-all-star-game-seen.html.
85. About GCSC, Greater Columbus Sports Commission,
http://www.columbussports.org/about/index.cfm. GCSC Board of Commissioners
Executive Committee members Brian Ellis and Ron Pizzuti negotiated CBJ's original
lease. McConnell v. Hunt Sport Enterprises Inc., 132 Ohio App. 3d 657, 667-70 (1999)
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to attract sporting events to Columbus to benefit the city
economically and socially.' While the Transaction's economic and
social benefits are suspect," the Transaction otherwise falls within the
GCSC's interest to promote sporting events including CBJ's NHL
games. To promote this interest, GCSC Executive Director Linda
Logan testified before Columbus City Council in support of the
Transaction." Private sector influence on the Transaction, including
influence from GCSC members, must be considered to determine
whether the Transaction serves the public interest.
CBJ management and ownership are heavily represented on the
GCSC Board of Commissioners Executive Committee, including CBJ
CEO Michael Priest, equity holder Ronald Pizzuti,a and Butch
Moore representing The Dispatch, another equity holder. As the
Transaction is designed to subsidize CBJ's large losses in recent years
to maintain CBJ in Columbus,' these CBJ equity holders have an
economic interest in the Transaction separate from any public
benefits that may accrue to the general public.
Additional conflicts of interest with The Dispatch are worth
noting because they further identify nonpublic benefits and call into
question the veracity of print media reports. As a 10% owner of
Nationwide Arena, The Dispatch received millions of dollars under
the Transaction.9' In addition, The Dispatch has an interest in
subsidizing CBJ to provide material for its sports page. These
pecuniary interests in the approval of the Transaction and CBJ's
involvement in the casino annexation dispute create at least the
appearance of a conflict of interest. Furthermore, The Dispatch's
recent acquisition of other media outlets gives it considerable control
(identifying Ronald Pizzuti as part of the CBJ ownership group that, among other things,
negotiated the original Arena lease with Nationwide executive Brian Ellis). The GCSC,
through Executive Director Linda Logan, publicly testified before Columbus City Council
on the Transaction. Caruso, supra note 3.
86. See text and accompanying notes, supra note 85 ("Greater Columbus Sports
Commission: About GCSC.").
87. See discussion infra Pt. III.
88. Caruso, supra note 3.
89. McConnell, 132 Ohio App. 3d at 667-70.
90. See discussion infra Pt. III.
91. Jeff Bell, State chips in $10M for Columbus arena buyout, COLUMBUS
BUSINESSFIRST, Oct. 31, 2011, http://www.bizjournals.com/columbus/blog/2011/10/state-
chips-in-its- 1Om-loan-for.html. The Dispatch has an equity interest in CBJ and, prior to
the Transaction, also had an ownership interest in the Arena.
over Central Ohio print media.2 As a result, the print media may not
be a reliable check on porous disclosure from government officials.
In a similar vein to CBJ's current ownership, GCSC Board of
Commissioners Executive Committee Chairman Brian Ellis,
President and Chief Operating Officer of Nationwide, stands to
privately gain from the Transaction. Prior to the Transaction,
Nationwide leased Nationwide Arena to CBJ, but CBJ had not paid
their rent in four years." As a result of the Transaction, Nationwide
transferred its interest in the Arena to the public sector and took on
an ownership interest in CBJ, which is subsidized with a below-
market use agreement for the Arena. Thus, Nationwide has a
pecuniary interest separate from the any public benefits that arise
from the Transaction. At least one commentator, however, argues
that Nationwide's role in the Transaction arises from a motive for
social responsibility rather than pecuniary gain.9
Perhaps the most prominent figure is Gene Smith, Athletic
Director at The Ohio State University, who represents Ohio State on
the GCSC Board of Commissioners Executive Committee. The
Transaction is designed, in part, to limit competition between Ohio
State's Jerome Schottenstein Center and Nationwide Arena to drive
down costs for non-hockey and non-Ohio State events, including
shows and acts." As part of this arrangement, Ohio State has a large
role in managing Nationwide Arena following the Transaction, but
92. Dan Eaton, Dispatch buys Columbus Monthly, Other Paper, COLUMBUS
BUSINESSFIRST, Sept. 27, 2011, http://www.bizjournals.com/columbus/news/2011/
09/27/dispatch-buys-columbus-monthly-other.html. It should be noted that Columbus
Business First also regularly reports on the Transaction.
93. Mandie Trimble, Arena Deal Falls Short of Solving Blue Jackets Fiscal Woes,
WOSU (Oct. 26, 2011), http://beta.wosu.org/news/2011/10/26/arena-deal-falls-short-of-
solving-blue-jackets-financial-woes/. (citing an email from Nationwide President Brian
Ellis); Mandie Trimble, Franklin County Commissioners Approve Arena Deal, WOSU
(Dec. 20, 2011), available at http://beta.wosu.org/news/2011/12/20/franklin-county-
commissioners-approve-arena-deal/.
94. Mark Williams, Team-ownership deal unusual, THE COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Sept.
15, 2011, http://www.dispatch.com/content/stories/business/2011/09/15/team-ownership-
deal-unusual.html.
95. Josh Jarman, Private manager for Nationwide Arena was formed to cover costs,
THE COLUMBUS DISPATCH (June 19, 2012), http://www.dispatch.com/content/stories/
local/2012/06/19/private-arena-manager-formed-to-cover-costs.html; Encarnacion Pyle,
OSU keeps arena deal a secret, THE COLUMBUS DISPATCH, May 30, 2012,
http://www.dispatch.com/content/stories/local/2010/05/30/osu-keeps-arena-deal-a-secret.
html ("Ohio State University says it doesn't matter financially where a performer lands-
at Nationwide Arena or the Schottenstein Center-because the two venues will co-
promote most events and share some of the profits."). OSU representative Xen Riggs will
manage the Arena following the Transaction.
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the financial details have not been fully disclosed.6 The Dispatch's
public records requests for these details have been denied,
purportedly justified by the trade-secret exception to public
disclosure." At a minimum, Ohio State, a public institution, has a
role in the Transaction that raises transparency concerns. But the
uncertainty regarding Ohio State's financial role in the Transaction
also raises substantive concerns about public finances.
In addition, political benefits are likely to accrue to politicians as
a result of the Transaction. GCSC Board of Commissioners
Executive Committee Member Rhett Ricart, representing the
FCCFA, stands to increase the FCCFA's prominence and facilitate
political benefits for politicians. That is, the Transaction increases the
FCCFA's importance to the political power structure in Columbus,
Ohio. By furthering interventionist economic development policies
with the Transaction, the FCCFA can expect to play a greater role in
future government decisions in Columbus and Franklin County.
Also, FCCFA members curry favor with politicians including Mayor
Michael Coleman, Columbus City Council members and the Franklin
County Commissioners. Politicians supporting the Transaction,
including Mayor Coleman, are able to claim that they are "doing
something to create or protect jobs" during the current economic
crisis, which is an assertion that will be critically challenged in Part
III.
Finally, lawyers and lobbyists involved with the Transaction
benefit from fees that the Transaction generates. These service-
96. An OSU representative and other OSU employees will manage Nationwide
Arena under the Transaction, but OSU will not receive a management fee and the
revenue sharing agreement for non-hockey events has not been disclosed. Arena Sub-
Management Agreement: Columbus Arena Management LLC and The Ohio State
University, Section 5.2 (providing for no management fee to OSU); Appendix C, Arena
Sub-Management Agreement: Non Hockey Event Scheduling and Revenue Distribution
Procedures (redacting some information). See discussion infra notes 214-16. Separately,
there are transparency issues surrounding Columbus Arena Management LLC. See, e.g.,
Lucas Sullivan, Nationwide Arena: Control handed to private board, THE COLUMBUS
DISPATCH, May 20, 2012, http://www.dispatch.com/content/stories/local/
2012/05/20/control-handed-to-private-board.html; Lucas Sullivan, O'Brien: Arena dealings
must be public, THE COLUMBUS DISPATCH, May 22, 2012, http://www.dispatch.com/
content/stories/local/2012/05/22obrien-arena-dealings-must-be-public.htm; Josh Jarman,
Arena official wants private operating board to be transparent, THE COLUMBUS DISPATCH,
June 4, 2012, http://www.dispatch.com/content/stories/local/2012/06/04/arena-meet.html;
Lucas Sullivan, Tiff on secret meetings slows down Nationwide Arena board, THE
COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Oct. 13, 2012, http://www.dispatch.com/content/stories/local/
2012/10/13/tiff-on-secret-meetings-slows-down-arena-board.html.
97. Pyle, supra note 95.
providers make the Transaction possible: lawyers write and negotiate
the Transaction's terms and lobbyists put interested parties in contact
with one another. For the Transaction, law firms Peck, Shaffer and
Williams LLP served as bond counsel and Dinsmore & Shohl, LLP
represented the FCCFA as general counsel." Put simply, lawyer and
lobbyist interest in generating fees are a private benefit that generate
additional support for the Transaction separate from incentives
driven by public benefits. The analysis that follows will examine to
what extent these private incentives influenced the public purchase of
Nationwide Arena.
B. Procedural Checks on the Transaction's Incentives and Other
Transparency Issues
Against this background, procedure is extremely important to
determine the public good because procedure is not based upon a
particular end-state or the effects upon individuals. Our democratic
institutions are designed with procedural safeguards to combat the
individual economic and political incentives that might otherwise
distort the public good toward a particular end-state. In this way,
upholding the integrity of our procedural rules is imperative to
maintain our democratic institutions as legitimate and combat the
self-interested economic and political incentives decision-makers
face. This section will discuss the Transaction's procedural
deficiencies, in effect casting doubt on the procedural checks on the
Transaction's decision-makers' individual economic and political
incentives.
1. Violating the Ohio Constitution
First and foremost, procedural checks on the Transaction are
highly questionable because the Transaction is illegal, as will be
explained in Part IV. A constitutional amendment to the Ohio
Constitution is necessary to authorize the Transaction. If the
Transaction is to be financed with casino tax revenue, existing Ohio
Constitutional provisions authorizing certain debt issuances do not
98. Attorneys representing public bodies that are parties to the Transaction each
approved only a portion of the Transaction, even though all documents must be read
together to understand the Transaction. Peck Shaffer & Williams LLP Letter Dated
March 28, 2012; Dinsmore & Shohl LLP Letter Dated March 28, 2012; Ron O'Brien,
Franklin County Prosecutor, Letter Dated March 28, 2012; Richard C. Pfeiffer, Jr.,
Columbus City Attorney, Letter Dated March 28, 2012. See also text and accompanying
notes infra note 221.
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serve as legitimate authority." As there was little public discourse
after I informed public decision-makers about serious legal and public
policy issues, it seems as though public officials did not take the Ohio
Constitution and related policy issues seriously.
In fact, there is little doubt that the Transaction attempts to
circumvent these checks on publicly financed projects. Voters
rejected ballot initiatives for increased taxes to fund a new sports
arena on five separate occasions." Clever-by-half financing, rather
than a meaningful distinction between new taxes and revenue debt,
provides the purported authority for Columbus, the FCCFA and the
Franklin County Commissioners to now approve the deal. 'o'
2. Special Issues with Transparency in Public Debt
The Transaction is not transparent insofar as there is a public
illusion regarding public debt issued to finance the Transaction.
Public debt is inherently suspect because it burdens future taxpayers,
who are not able to represent their interests during negotiations, with
investment risk and interest expense. 02 While issuing public debt for
capital investment can benefit future generations, in fact benefits are
99. See discussion infra Pt. IV. (citing OHIO CONST. art. VIII §13).
100. Key dates in the Nationwide Arena Deal, THE COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Sept. 15,
2011, http://www.dispatch.com/content/stories/local/2011/09/15/arena-deal-timeline-art-
g20e57tm-1.html. (Voters previously rejected tax issues for arenas and stadiums in 1978
(65 percent), 1981 (79 percent), 1986 (53 percent) and 1987 (56 percent)). Although
media outlets and public officials agree that voters rejected tax hikes for a sports arena on
five occasions, the Franklin County Board of Elections website provided elections results
for only three such elections. See Franklin County Board of Elections, Abstract of the
Votes Cast at the General Election Held on Tuesday, November 3rd, 1981, in Franklin
County, Ohio, at 31, http://vote.franklincountyohio.gov/assets/pdf/l981/general/Official-
Results-General-Election-November-3-1981.pdf; Franklin County Board of Elections,
Abstract of the Votes Cast at the General Election Held on Tuesday, November 3rd, 1987, in
Franklin County, Ohio, at 5, http://vote.franklincountyohio.gov/assets/pdf/1987/generall
Official-resuls-General-Election-November-3-1987.pdf; Franklin County Board of
Elections, Official Results: Primary Election of May 6, 1997 in Franklin County, Ohio,
http://vote.franklincountyohio.gov/assets/pdf/1997/primary/Official-Results-Primary-
Election-May-6-1997.pdf.
101. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5739.021 (West 2005) (explaining the process for a
county to submit a sales tax proposal to electors).
102. See discussion infra Pt. 111(A). See also Edward Zelinsky, Panel 2: Community
Efforts to Attract and Retain Corporations: Legal and Policy Implications of State and
Local Tax Incentives and Eminent Domain: Tax Incentives for Economic Development:
Personal (and Pessimistic) Reflections, 58 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1145, 1149 (2008); Peter
Enrich, Saving the States from Themselves: Commerce Clause Constraints on the State Tax
Incentives for Business, 110 HARv. L. REV. 377, 393 (1996); Rachel Weber, Why Local
Economic Development Incentives Don't Create Jobs, 32 URB. LAW 97, 104 n.26 (2002).
often not conferred upon future generations."os Public borrowers can
secure lending from creditors without conferring benefits on future
generations, in part, because future generations often do not have
meaningful exit options to avoid prior period debt. Exit options are
limited due to strong familial and societal ties to a particular
jurisdiction that likely outweigh public debt concerns when making
locational decisions."> Ultimately, some regard public debt as
permanent because future generations are reluctant to raise taxes or
otherwise raise funds to retire public debt for prior consumption."
Moreover, there is a public illusion in which current period
beneficiaries of public goods and services funded with debt perceive
such goods and services to be cheaper than they really are due to
deferred costs (i.e., future taxes)." While public benefits are enjoyed
currently, many costs (i.e., taxes, special assessments and user fees)
are deferred to later periods. Critics argue that current period
beneficiaries and taxpayers are able to internalize or discount future
period costs to defray this illusion-what is sometimes known as
Ricardian Equivalence."o
However, individuals tend to discount future benefits and costs
too heavily for public projects such that Ricardian Equivalence is
problematic even if it is assumed that taxpayers do attempt to take a
long-term perspective. Individuals do not live eternally nor know
how long they will live and therefore cannot discount capital projects
that exceed these time restraints.'" Further, individuals may not take
future costs into account because there is no personal liability for
103. Julie A. Roin, Privatization and the Sale of Tax Revenues, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1965,
1972 (2011). See also Zelinsky, supra note 102, at 1150; Peter Enrich, Business Tax
Incentives: A Status Report, 34 URB. LAW. 415, 422 (2002).
104. Viktor Vanberg & James Buchanan, Organization Theory and Fiscal Economics,
14 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF JAMES M. BUCHANAN: DEBT AND TAXES 440-41.
105. James Buchanan, Public Debt and Capital Formation, 14 THE COLLECTED
WORKS OF JAMES M. BUCHANAN: DEBT AND TAXES 377. The perspective that public
debt is permanent may be troublesome because a major difficulty with social continuity is
passing capital on to future generations, and in as "fair" a manner as possible, however
society defines "fair." See Knight III, supra note 12, at 374-75.
106. JAMES M. BUCHANAN, PUBLIC FINANCE IN DEMOCRATIC PROCESS 15, 23, 138-
39 (1967).
107. JAMES M. BUCHANAN, 2 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF JAMES M. BUCHANAN:
PUBLIC PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC DEBT: A DEFENSE AND RESTATEMENT 2.8.21-2.8.31
(1958), http://www.econlib.org/library/Buchanan/buchCv2.htm).
108. Id. at 2.8.24, 2.8.30, 2.12.24.
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public debt.'09 Admittedly, individuals may act in their self-interest
perpetually to benefit the family interest and posterity.
Nonetheless, rational individuals partaking in the collective
decision-making process are unlikely to properly discount future
benefits and debt burdens for other reasons."o First, unless a tax is
levied for a particular public good or service, taxpayers have great
difficulty identifying the portion of their tax bill attributable to a
particular good or service."' Taxpayers, then, have difficulty even
identifying their individual burden to partake in the present value
analysis in the first place. Second, individuals will discount too
heavily future costs and benefits in the present value analysis because
many public goods are specialized goods and services without a liquid
market.112 Without a liquid market, future benefits are limited
because it is difficult to convert the asset to income or borrow against
the asset to maximize value."' Furthermore, the absence of a liquid
market makes it more difficult for individuals to assess value. Third,
citizens who do not pay taxes under our progressive taxing system will
not internalize future costs because they do not expect to pay future
taxes.114 As a result of the foregoing, public debt creates a fiscal
illusion because both costs and benefits associated with debt-funded
projects are difficult to assess. The burdens that public debt inflicts
on future generations, including investment risk and interest expense,
will be explained in Part III infra.
3. Transparency in Public Statements About the Transaction
Facts and circumstances specific to the Transaction raise further
questions regarding procedural integrity and the influence of
individual economic and political incentives. As noted above,
Franklin County voters rejected tax increases to fund a new sports
arena on five separate occasions."- Voter approval was not sought for
the Transaction and financing with debt rather than a new tax is not a
meaningful policy distinction because it still obligates future
taxpayers until 2039. Columbus Auditor Hugh Dorrian has publicly
touted the Transaction as distinct from the voter rejected proposals
109. BUCHANAN & WAGNER, supra note 26, at 8.3.24.
110. BUCHANAN, supra note 107, at 2.12.30.
111. BUCHANAN, supra note 106, at 26.
112. BUCHANAN, supra note 107, at 2.12.26.
113. Id. at 2.12.27.
114. Id. at 2.8.25, 2.12.27-2.12,28.
115. See text and accompanying notes supra note 100. See also Caruso, supra note 2.
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for a sports arena on the basis that it does not "increase taxes.""
Less than a year after approving the Transaction, however, the City
passed a new individual income tax on casino gambling winnings, and
income derived from other games of chance, including longstanding
church raffles and the state-run lottery."' The new tax does not
directly provide revenue for CBJ and the incidence of the tax is on
individuals rather than casinos, but the new tax may be considered a
related tax increase because the Transaction disposes of casino tax
revenue and the new tax raises revenue related to casino gambling.
Auditor Dorrian also stated to Columbus City Council that there
is no commitment to repay the revenue debt funding the Transaction
if casino revenues do not materialize."' Government entities do not
have a legal obligation to repay the bonds issued as part of the
Transaction if casino tax revenue does not materialize."9 However,
identifying Nationwide as carrying the risk of loss is dubious.
Columbus and Franklin County have a guaranteed loss because the
Transaction is a below-market transaction that is designed to
subsidize CBJ. Moreover, even absent a legal obligation to repay the
bonds if casino tax revenue does not materialize, Columbus and
Franklin County are likely to repay the bonds to preserve their credit
ratingsl2 and maintain their relationship with Nationwide."'
116. Caruso, supra note 2. ("Dorrian pointed out yesterday that voters had turned
down arena taxes five times in the past 30 years. But, he said, 'there's a fundamental
difference between those attempts and this attempt: Those called for an increase in
taxes."').
117. City of Columbus Ordinance 1769-2012, http://columbus.legistar.com/
LegislationDetail.aspx?ID=1159729&GUID=8A5AA83-F704-42B6-9CD3-8B371AA8D
OF7#.UB7gXeM2g4s.email. See also Lucas Sullivan, Ohio casino cities tax your winnings,
THE COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Aug. 5, 2012, http://www.dispatch.com/content/stories/
local/2012/08/05/ohio-casino-cities-tax-your-winnings.htm; Lucas Sullivan, City to tax
casino jackpots, THE COLUMBUS DISPATCH, July 31, 2012, http://www.dispatch.
com/content/stories/local/2012/07/31/city-to-tax-jackpots.htmi.
118. Caruso, supra note 3 ("'If the casino revenue goes away, what is the city's
commitment to this going forward?' Ginther asked Dorrian after Downing's comments.
'None,' Dorrian replied.").
119. Id. (statements of Auditor Hugh Dorrian and Attorney John Rosenberg). For the
Transaction, as payments to bondholders (i.e., Nationwide) are pegged to casino tax
revenue, bondholders will not be repaid if there is no casino tax revenue. See discussion
and citing documents infra Part IV(B)(1).
120. State ex rel. Saxbe v. Brand, 176 Ohio St. 44, 52,197 N.E.2d 328, 333 (1964).
The sale of revenue bonds of the state to raise money necessarily
involves a borrowing of money even though no indebtedness of the
state results. If the bonds are not paid, the borrowing power of the
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Defaulting on bonds, even revenue bonds, has potential for an
adverse effect on Columbus' credit rating, which will increase interest
rates on future debt issuances."'
The Transaction also demonstrates creditor influence to
renegotiate transactions. As reported by Columbus City Officials,
including Mayor Michael Coleman's Office, CBJ "creditors"
influenced Columbus City Council and the FCCFA to prematurely
vote on the Transaction.'23 City officials did not disclose the identity
of these creditors when they stated that creditors rushed the
Transaction's approval, but at least one report has since identified the
creditors as local and national banks.24
Creditor influence casts doubt on Auditor Dorrian's statement
that Nationwide carries risk of loss if casino tax revenue does not
materialize. In recognizing that Columbus City Council and the
FCCFA prematurely approved the Transaction to appease creditors,
Mayor Coleman recognizes the very same extra-legal market forces
(i.e., creditors) that have been dismissed in other contexts. Expressly,
City of Columbus officials are arguing on the one hand that market
forces do not create a commitment to repay, while arguing on the
other hand that the same market forces compelled the Transaction's
premature approval. The statements are not reconcilable here as
consistent with one another: either creditors influence financial
decisions or they do not.
Moreover, a Columbus School Board member stated that he did
not expect future property tax revenues from the Nationwide Arena
parcel because he expected, as in fact occurred, Nationwide to
state will as a result be adversely affected, even though the bonds do
not represent a debt of the state.
Id. See also Oesterle supra note 9, at 613-14 (stating that "the financial concept of debt
does not depend on the revenue source for the debt payment," but rather reflects the
obligation to repay a fixed sum certain).
121. Jeff Bell, Deal will leave little for Columbus schools, COLUMBus BUSINESSFIRST,
Sept. 30, 2011, at 38.
122. Brand, 176 Ohio St. at 52. See also Oesterle, supra note 9, at 613-14.
123. Lucas Sullivan & Doug Caruso, Jackets' creditors sped city's arena-deal vote, THE
COLUMBUs DISPATCH, Nov. 20, 2011, http://www.bluejacketsxtra.com/content/stories/
2011/11/20/11.20-jackets-creditors-spurred-arena-deal.html.
124. Alex Fischer, the President of Columbus Partnership, a group of local leaders that
is designed to "improve the economic vitality of the Columbus region," stated that the
creditors were a group of local and national banks deciding whether to extend a line of
credit to CBJ. Ghose, supra note 43. It should be noted that CBJ has not paid rent to
Nationwide Realty, a creditor, in four years. Trimble, supra note 93.
renegotiate the existing property tax abatement for a longer term.12
Therefore, the presence of a revenue stream (i.e., casino money) to
service debt does not meaningfully distinguish debt from levying a
new tax in this context because the public will likely pay for the
Arena even absent that revenue stream. And as noted above, debt
financing is a less transparent use of public funds.126
Separately, the Transaction is not transparent because it distorts
prior voter approval for gambling in Ohio. Voters approved a
lengthy amendment to the Ohio Constitution authorizing casino
gambling under the impression that such funds would be directed
substantially to public school districts.127 While this holds true, the
Transaction now allocates substantial gambling revenue to subsidize
professional hockey, which is far removed from educational purposes.
To the extent that the Transaction is designed to promote economic
development, it does not fit the casino amendment's billing as
promoting job development through workforce training."8
In sum, Part II identified the need for nonelectoral constitutional
fiscal restraints to limit the influence of individual economic and
political incentives as they relate to the Transaction. To address these
concerns with self-interest and public investment, the Ohio
Constitution provides provisions to limit government powers to issue
public debt and invest public resources in the private sector.
Following poor early 19th Century public investments in Ohio
railroads, canals and turnpikes, Ohio's constitutional restrictions on
lending government aid or credit were adopted to greatly limit public
investment in private enterprise. 29 Part IV will examine these
provisions, their policy rationale and their effectiveness as they relate
to the Transaction, but first it is necessary to discuss economic
development policy, as will be done in Part III.
III. Economic Development:
Public Policy and Return on Investment
Policy rationale regarding public finances is important to explain
why constitutional fiscal restraints should be respected and enforced.
125. Bell, supra note 121.
126. Clayton Gillette, Fiscal Home Rule, 86 DENV. U. L. REV. 1241, 1247 (2009).
127. OHIO CONST. art XV, § 6(C).
128. Id.
129. OHIO CONST. art. VIII, §§ 4,6. See also Gold, supra note 7, at 411-12.
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Otherwise, public financing schemes may be justified with reference
to similar ill-conceived projects in other jurisdictions and critics may
dismiss complicated constitutional violations as formalistic bickering
amongst lawyers.' To further the discourse regarding public finance
in Ohio, this section discusses: (1) general principles of public debt
and public spending; (2) Keynesian economics; and (3) applying these
principles to the Transaction.
A. Principles of Public Debt
Classical principles of public debt differ greatly from the
intellectual basis, if any, upon which the Transaction is founded.
Classical principles authorize public debt issuance merely to facilitate
voluntary wealth transfer from the private sector to the public
sector."' Taxation, on the other hand, transfers private wealth to the
public sector coercively.
The Transaction goes beyond the classical transfer function
because proponents argue that the Transaction will facilitate
economic prosperity in Columbus' Arena District. That is, the debt
issuance does not merely transfer funds to the public sector to
provide for public goods or services, but goes further to invest the
debt proceeds in order to realize or earn public benefits."' In seeking
a public return on investment, public officials burden future
generations with the risk of loss regarding the underlying investment
and interest payments on the debt principal.'33
Some critics argue that public debt does not burden the private
sector because it is not coercive and "we owe it to ourselves.""'
However, these critics may overlook the effect that public debt has on
crowding out private sector investment."' To justify burdening future
generations with investment risk and interest payments, public
officials should not compare public investment returns with only the
future interest burden. In addition, they must establish that the
130. See, e.g., Sullivan & Caruso, supra note 123 ("Josh Cox, chief counsel in the city
attorney's office, said the delay in producing the final draft can be summed up in one
word: 'Lawyers."').
131. BUCHANAN, supra note 107, at 2.8.6,2.8.16.
132. Id.
133, Id. at 2.8.27
134. Id. at 2.6.2-2.6.3. Note that this analysis is not materially altered whether there is
internal or external debt. Id. at 2.6.16.
135. Id. at 2.4.13-2.4.18.
public return on investment exceeds the return on investment that
would otherwise be realized in the private sector.'36
Here, because the Transaction is grounded in economic
development policy, which places emphasis on return on investment,
proponents must establish that the Transaction will realize a greater
return than would otherwise be realized in the private sector.
Astoundingly, Transaction proponents have not even calculated a
return on investment, much less established that the return on
investment is positive, compared that return to comparable displaced
private sector investment, or disclosed their methodology."' One
explanation is that there is simply no intellectual basis for the
Transaction, which is especially plausible because Transaction
proponents have provided confusing explanations in response to
media inquiries regarding the 2012 NHL lockout and the
Transaction."'
B. Keynesian Economics and Calculating Public Return on Investment
To calculate return on investment in the public sector, public
debt proponents traditionally rely on Keynesian economic theory,
which warrants an explanation. Keynesians first identify a trade-off
between inflation and unemployment, or what is known as the
Philips' Curve."' So the reasoning goes, expansionary fiscal and/or
monetary policies (accompanied with inflation) will increase
aggregate demand, which will cause unemployment rates to fall.40
Once there is "full employment," there will be a "full employment
136. See id. at Chapter 12 (discussing Ricardian Equivalence, explained in Pt. 2 supra,
and individuals' ability to discount future costs and benefits associated with public
projects, which analysis necessarily incorporates return on investment).
137. Following diligent research of available information and both oral and written
inquiries to public officials and Transaction proponents, I am not aware that any
Transaction proponents have explained whether the Transaction has a positive return on
investment. Specifically, I have publicly requested information regarding return on
investment during testimony before the Columbus City Council and Franklin County
Convention Facilities Authority, as well as written inquiry to the Franklin County
Commissioners.
138. For instance, "City Auditor Hugh Dorrian said the loss of tax revenue from the
last season-long lockout did not significantly affect the city's income-tax collections."
Jarman, supra note 83. But if the Blue Jackets do not have an impact on income tax
revenue due to a Keynesian multiplier, the Transaction is not likely to create jobs and,
further, the Transaction is even less likely to have a positive return on investment.
139. BUCHANAN & WAGNER, supra note 26, at 8.11.13. See also Milton Friedman,
Nobel Lecture: Inflation and Unemployment, 85 J. POL. ECON. 451, 459-471 (June 1977)
(noting that higher inflation is often accompanied by higher, not lower, unemployment).
140. BUCHANAN & WAGNER,supra note 26, at 8.11.8-8.11.16.
348 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OUARTERLY [Vol. 40:2
Winter 2013] NATIONWIDE ARENA AND OHIO'S FISCAL CONSTITUTION 349
surplus" available to pay off the debts accrued during prior periods.141
In sum, Keynesians will balance the budget over the business cycle
rather than annually. 42
Keynesian reasoning is suspect, however, because political
incentives in democratic institutions affect collective decision-making
in ways that would not be present if a benevolent despot
implemented these policies."' Public debt may be regarded as
permanent because current generations will be reluctant to retire
debt incurred for prior period consumption or poor capital
investment.'" Further, Keynesians have difficulty defining "full
employment" and the "business cycle" because they must first
identify structural unemployment.'45 Structural unemployment is
present not because there are liquidity concerns and a lack of capital
to implement good projects, but rather because there is a lack of good
projects, natural resources, workers with skills that match the skills
employers seek, or skilled workers located where employers are
located. At least to the extent that there is structural unemployment,
expansionary policies to increase aggregate demand will only lower
unemployment in the short term.' In the long run, if expansionary
policies are implemented during full employment (perhaps due to
political incentives to deficit spend or unidentified high structural
unemployment), these policies will result in draining public capital
from future generations and realize no lasting public benefit.'47
Even if there were a benevolent despot to implement these
policies or if collective decision-making were somehow not influenced
by individual self-interests, Keynesian economics requires that public
officials identify a public benefit as stimulus ripples through the
economy to increase aggregate demand with a multiplier effect.'
141. Id. at 8.10.14.
142. Id. at 8.10.11.
143. Id. at 8.6.3.
144. Id. at 8.10.34-8.10.35. See also Buchanan, supra note 106, at 377.
145. BUCHANAN & WAGNER, supra note 26, at 8.4.37.
146. Id. at 8.11.15.
147 Id. at 8.11.15. See also Buchanan, supra note 106, at 375; James Buchanan, The
Economic Consequences of the Deficit, 14 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF JAMES M.
BUCHANAN: DEBT AND TAXES 447.
148. Dale Oesterle, State and Local Government Subsidies for Business: A Siren's
Trap, 6 OHIO ST. ENTREPREN. Bus. L.J. 491,497 (2011).
In theory, Keynesians argue that as the government injects money into
the economy, private entities and individuals have more money to
Under Keynesian reasoning, the multiplier effect is inversely related
to income taxes: as income taxes rise, individual propensity to
consume decreases and with it, the multiplier.'49 Columbus voters
recently approved an income tax increase from 2% to 2.5%, which
has a negative impact on the Transaction's Keynesian multiplier
effect under this reasoning."
A positive return on investment is necessary to sustainable
economic development that attracts investment capital."' Without a
positive return on investment, but rather a negative return on
investment, government coffers are depleted and must be restored.
As a result, new taxes, user fees or assessments will be levied or
imposed and, if imposed on businesses, harm the local business
environment and economic development by making the jurisdiction
less attractive to investors."' Also, the business environment may
discourage investment capital because fairness is lost. Uncertainty
may arise when government investment in private businesses affects
private business outcomes (i.e., the government picks winners and
losers)."' With increasing amounts of government intervention,
successful business plans are built around government assistance
rather than good products/service and efficiency."' Furthermore,
spend, aggregate demand increases and the higher aggregate demand
incentivizes private entities to produce more and hire more to increase
production. Government spending creates a cascade effect, a
multiplier, as the immediate boost to employment and output itself
produces a second, third, fourth and beyond level ripple effect on
employment and output. The total impact of any government
expenditure stimulus is the sum of all these separate output ripples.
The ratio of the initial government expenditure to the total impact, the
sum of the ripples, is called the "Keynesian Multiplier" or the
"Spending Multiplier."
Id.
149. RICHARD MUSGRAVE AND PEGGY MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC FINANCE IN THEORY
AND PRACTICE 504 (1989). But see MILTON FRIEDMAN, A THEORY OF THE
CONSUMPTION FUNCTION 220-25, 233-35 (Princeton University Press, 1957) (explaining
the "permanent income hypothesis," in which current period income is not directly related
to consumption).
150. See Robert Vitale, Columbus Gets its Tax Increase, THE COLUMBUS DISPATCH,
Aug. 5,2009, http://www.dispatch.com/content/stories/local/2009/08/05/electionweb2.html.
151. Enrich, supra note 102, at 397-405.
152. Zelinsky, supra note 102, at 1150.
153. Id. at 1151.
154. Neil Westergaard, Go away, government. Take subsidies, too?, COLUMBUS
13USINESSFIRST, Sept. 2, 2011, http://www.bizjournals.com/columbus/print-edition/2011/09/
02/go-away-government-take-subsidies.html.
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business subsidies at the state and local levels are ineffective. because
state and local taxes are not a primary determinant of where
businesses locate."' Rather, the regulatory environment, availability
of skilled workers (and education systems) and availability of other
raw materials significantly affect firm locational decisions.
To more fully examine the Transactions policy merits, then, it is
necessary to determine whether there is likely to be a multiplier effect
that warrants the public expenditure on the Transaction. Perhaps
revealing an incentive for the Transaction's proponents' failure to
calculate return on investment, the following section shows that
positive return on investment is unlikely indeed.
C. The Transaction's Return on Investment
The Transaction is not likely to have a positive return on
investment. The Franklin County Commissioners identify raising tax
revenue as a purpose for the Transaction despite the foregone casino
tax revenue under the Transaction.' Precisely because the
Transaction is designed to raise tax revenue, public officials should
calculate return on investment to determine whether foregone casino
tax revenue exceeds the tax revenue that the Transaction will
preserve or, as a more appropriate metric, create. The 2008 Report
from the John Glenn School of Public Affairs, published prior to the
Transaction and now cited by Transaction proponents for support,'
states that it does not calculate return on investment for the Arena
investment because it is privately funded and public funds associated
with the Arena were limited."' Under this line of reasoning, the
government should now calculate return on investment before
approving a public proposal to purchase the Arena.
It is extremely doubtful that the Transaction will result in a
positive return on investment. Put simply, if the Arena was not a
good investment for Nationwide in the private sector, then it is not
155. Enrich, supra note 102, at 391-92; id. at 418-19; Weber, supra note 102, at 97;
Zelinsky, supra note 102, at 1151.
156. Franklin County Commissioner John O'Grady's cover letter to Peck, Shaffer, &
Williams LLP, Letter Dated November 14, 2011, attached as Exhibit B.
157. Caruso, supra note 63.
158. John Glenn School of Public Affairs, Phase 1 Report: Assessments of the Gross
Impacts of the NHL Columbus Blue Jackets, Nationwide Arena, and the Arena District on
Greater Columbus, 1998-2008, at 5-6, http://glennschool.osu.edu/news/art/Phasel
report.pdf.
clear why the investment will be a materially better investment in the
public sector.'
Under Keynesian economic theory, funds invested in Nationwide
Arena and CBJ will stimulate growth in the Arena District due to a
multiplier or ripple effect that creates economic activity many times
over& However, a positive return on investment is extremely
unlikely even assuming a generous 10% tax rate, including sales,
property, and city income taxes. Assuming a 10% effective tax rate,
the Transaction must stimulate 10 times the amount of economic
activity (a multiplier of 10) to earn a positive return on investment.
In other words, the Transaction must create $10 of activity for every
$1 in public funds spent. For example, a subsidy of $100 would have
to stimulate $1,000 in activity (taxed at 10%), to recoup its
investment. Empirical studies simply do not support multiplier of 10,
but rather tend to show multipliers around 1.0.16' Applied to the
Transaction, the $250 million that is slated to be doled out over the
course of the Transaction 62 would have to stimulate $2.5 billion in
activity, which is complicated further by inflation.
If there were a positive return on investment calculated, it would
likely require making dubious assumptions. First, it is not at all clear
that CBJ would leave Columbus but for the public purchasing the
Arena.6 1 In light of CBJ's $25 million loss last year," the estimated
159. Arguments justifying the Transaction on the basis that it is less costly than
constructing a new sports arena presuppose that Columbus needs a public sports arena.
Moreover, such arguments overlook that the Transaction acquires the Arena primarily to
subsidize rent-free CBJ Arena use, not public use. See discussion infra Part IV (analyzing
the Transaction).
160. Ghose, supra note 43 ("The unprofitable Blue Jackets, as the argument goes, are
a loss leader necessary for the sake of the Arena District, an economic engine that fills
government coffers with sales, income and property taxes."). See also Oesterle, supra note
148, at 496-99.
161. Oesterle supra note 148, at 496 (citing Professor Robert Barro).
162. Bill Bush and Doug Caruso, Arena deal looks good to folks in high places, THE
COLUMBUs DISPATCH, Sept. 15, 2011, http://www.dispatch.com/content/stories/
local/2011/09/15/arena-deal-looks-good-to-folks-in-high-places.html. The $250 million
figure is stated in future value terms.
163. Doug Caruso, Proposed Deal: Casino Tax revenue would fund purchase of
Nationwide Arena, THE COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Sept. 15, 2011, http://www.dispatch.com/
content/stories/local/2011/09/14/Proposal-to-keep-Blue-Jackets-in-town-to-be-released-
today.html (stating that "Blue Jackets majority owner John P. McConnell has said he will
consider moving the team if the lease deal is not reworked."). Upon announcement of the
Transaction, Blue Jackets President Mike Priest stated, "This report offers a solution that
will provide a long-term sustainable business model for the organization." Caruso, supra
note 2.
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$9.5 million that CBJ will save each year under the Transaction may
not be enough for CBJ to turn a profit.'5 Thus, the Transaction may
not be enough to save CBJ from dissolution in the long run."
Furthermore, there has been little indication that other cities have
expressed serious interest in CBJ.
Second, it is far from clear that all the economic activity in the
Arena District is attributable to CBJ.67 In fact, it is more likely that
Columbus and Franklin County will thrive even in CBJ's hypothetical
absence. During the NHL lockout in 2005, unbiased academic
research shows that city economies did not experience material
detrimental effects." The studies that Columbus Mayor Michael
Coleman cites to support public investment in private enterprise are
funded by biased special interests."' In addition, CBJ's ranking as the
worst team in the NHL during the 2011-12 season casts doubt upon
the view that it underpins the entire Columbus economy.o
If the Transaction's proponents were truly concerned about the
Arena District's viability should CBJ leave or dissolve, they should
have voiced these concerns before voters approved the 2010 casino
relocation amendment to the Ohio Constitution that moved the
Columbus casino out of the Arena District, as discussed in Part II.'71
The casino could have acted as the anchor tenant the Transaction's
proponents identify as necessary to attract consumers to the Arena
164. Yerdon, supra note 43; Ghose, supra note 43; Caruso, supra note 2 ("The Blue
Jackets have said they are losing $10 million to $12 million per year on their lease deal
with Nationwide.").
165. Franklin County Convention Facilities Finance Subcommittee, NATIONWIDE
ARENA PROPOSAL SUMMARY REPORT, at 17, http://council.columbus.gov/uploadedFiles/
City Council/News/Releases/2011/FinalReport-JohnRosenberger9l4ll.pdf.
166. See Caruso supra note 3 ("But David Ebersole, an Ohio State University law
student, said the deal is too complex to be transparent and that it has no hope of showing a
return on investment").
167. By alluding to all economic activity in the Arena District, many government
officials have made this implicit assumption. For example, FCCFA Executive Director
William Jennison stated, "It would actually cost the community more not to do this
because if you were to lose that economic activity, it would be much more costly than the
amount of casino taxes that are being invested." Panel unveils Plan to keep Blue Jackets,
ESPN (Sept. 14, 2011, 8:15 PM), http://espn.go.com/nhl/story/l/id/6971173/group-hopes-
use-casino-sustain-columbus-blue-jackets. See also Caruso supra note 2, ("My motivation
is economic development," said Columbus City Auditor Hugh J. Dorrian. "We're not
talking about a few jobs; we're talking about thousands of jobs.").
168. See supra note 63 and accompanying text (citing studies).
169. Id.
170. 2011-12 NHL Standings, ESPN, http://espn.go.com/nhl/standings.
171. OHto CONST. art. XV, §6(c).
District had the casino been constructed in the Arena District as
originally planned.1 72 Instead, the casino is now located elsewhere and
the Transaction's proponents, who have been planning the
Transaction for years,'173 now claim that the Arena is necessary to
promote economic development in the Arena District. Due to The
Dispatch's heavy involvement in the casino annexation dispute,
discussed above, the move may have been designed to appease The
Dispatch.
Against this backdrop, stewards of public funds should be held to
a high burden of proof when they invest public resources in private
businesses.174 In this case, return on investment has not even been
calculated, much less shown to be positive or to compensate for
crowded out private sector investment (i.e., opportunity cost). Public
policy regarding economic development does not justify, and has not
been shown to justify, approving the Nationwide Arena Transaction.
IV. The Ohio Constitution
A. Public Investment in Private Enterprise: Public Policy and the Spirit
of the Ohio Constitution
The Transaction raises serious public policy issues and violates
the spirit of the Ohio Constitution. Public investment in private
enterprise motivated Ohio's 1850-51 Constitutional Convention."' To
be sure, the debate over public investment in the private sector is
172. Bell, supra note 121.
173. Caruso, supra note 2 ("Dorrian, Columbus lawyer John Rosenberger and Bill
Jennison, executive director of the Franklin County Convention Facilities Authority,
rolled out a plan yesterday that has been two years in the making."); Jeff Bell, Year later,
Blue Jackets backers see little progress on resolving team's financial woes, COLUMBUS
BUSINESS FIRST (Jan. 28, 2011), http://www.bizjournals.com/columbus/print-edition/
2011/01/28/year-later-blue-jackets-backers-see.html?page=all.
174. Oesterle, supra note 148, at 502. See also Enrich, supra note 102, at 421-22.
175. Gold, supra note 7, at 411.
Although agitation over race, temperance, and judicial reform all
contributed to the convocation of a constitutional convention in 1850,
the major motivating force was anti-corporation sentiment within the
Democratic party. Radical Democrats objected to public subsidization
of private companies and to the "special privileges" granted in
corporate charters; they were angered by the tax burdens imposed on
citizens for the benefit of private companies and by the public losses
incurred when subsidized corporations failed.
Id.
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essentially a debate over the purposes of government."' Throughout
U.S. history governments have debated the meaning of "public
purpose" as it relates to public spending."
In Ohio, 19th century public investments in railroads, canals and
turnpikes often resulted in incomplete infrastructure projects, while
still benefitting those with a financial interest in short-term
profitability in the less developed capital markets of the day."'8 Even
the completed projects benefitted only parts of the state while
alienating other parts of the tax base."' At the 1850-51 Convention,
delegates debated whether public investment deterred or precluded
private investment in these capital-intensive projects with an unfair
business environment."
As a result, Ohio adopted its present-day constitution, including
Art. VIII §§4, 6, to draw the line between public investment in private
enterprise that is necessary to promote infrastructure and those
investments that violate the public trust.' Unlike many state
176. Id. at 417-18.
177. See generally Dale F. Rubin, Constitutional Aid Limitation Provisions and the
Public Purpose Doctrine, 12 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REV. 143,147 (1993).
178. Gold, supra note 7, at 412. Spurred on by the success of the Erie Canal, Ohio
Governor Ethan Allen Brown called for state-owned systems of canals connecting Lake
Erie with the Ohio River. Id. at 408. In 1837, Ohio even adopted a "Loan Law" that
required the state to provide one-third of the capital to construct private canals, railroads
and turnpikes if private investors could provide two-thirds of the capital. Id. at 408-09
(citing Ohio Laws 35 v. 76 (1837)).
179. Id.
180. Id. at 413.
[The delegates] maintained that notwithstanding the Erie Canal, a rare
exception founded on geographical fortune, state enterprise meant
"extravagance and waste"' private capital would always be found to
build any works worth building, and would build them more
economically. Moreover, the opponents insisted that "government has
no business to be engaged in any speculations, and no tax is legitimate
except for the purpose of sustain government within its proper sphere.
Id. (citing REPORT OF THE DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONVENTION FOR THE
REVISION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF OHIO, 1850-51, at Vol. 1, 513, at Vol.
II, 120)). At the convention, little debate surrounded the merits of OHIO CONST. art. VIII
Section 4 which prohibits the state from lending its credit to private entities; it passed with
only six dissenting votes. Id. at 412. However, there were opponents to Section 6, the
municipal analog to Section 4. Id. at 416. These opponents "insisted that few such
improvements would be built by private capital alone." Id. at 416. Nonetheless, private
capital "poured" into Ohio to build railroads in the 1850s. Id. at 424.
181. Id. at 412-22. As the Ohio Supreme Court explained Sections 4 and 6 in an early
case:
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judiciaries, the Ohio Supreme Court upheld constitutional fiscal
restraints, including §§4, 6." The Court did, however, permit
Under the constitution of 1802, numerous special acts of legislation
had authorized counties, cities, towns, and townships, to become
stockholders in private corporations, organized for the construction of
railroads, to be owned and operated by such corporations. The stock
thus subscribed by the local authorities was generally authorized to be
paid for by the issue of bonds, which were to be paid by taxes assessed
upon the property of their constituent bodies. Many of these
enterprises proved unprofitable, and the stock became valueless. Some
of them wholly failed. Heavy taxation followed to meet and discharge
the interest and principal of the bonds thus issued. Towns and
townships were induced to attempt repudiation of their contracts. And,
as the records of this court abundantly show, the assessment and
collection of the taxes, which the preservation of good faith required,
had repeatedly to be enforced by mandamus. In many, if not all of
these cases, it was alleged that the stock subscriptions sought to be
enforced had been voted for and made under the influence of false and
fraudulent representations made by interested officers and agents of
the corporation to be aided by the subscription. At the time of the
formation and adoption of the present constitution these evils had
begun to be seriously felt, and excited the gravest apprehensions of
calamitous results. Under such circumstances this section was made a
part of the State constitution. It may be well again to recur to its
language: "The general assembly shall never authorize any county,
city, town, or township, by vote of its citizens or otherwise, to become
a stockholder in any joint stock company, corporation, or association
whatever; or raise money for, or loan its credit to, or in aid of any such
company, corporation, or association." The mischief which this section
interdicts is a business partnership between a municipality or
subdivision of the State, and individuals or private corporations or
associations. It forbids the union of public and private capital or credit
in any enterprise whatever. In no project originated by individuals,
whether associated or otherwise, with a view to gain, are the municipal
bodies named permitted to participate in such manner as to incur
pecuniary expense or liability. They may neither become stockholders
nor furnish money or credit for the benefit of the parties interested
therein.
Walker v. City of Cincinnati, 21 Ohio St. 14, 53-54 (1871). At the 1873-74 Ohio
constitutional convention, "[delegates] complained of the corruption that invaded the
political process when public authorities parceled out railroad "offices and contracts" and
when private interests had a direct financial stake in the outcome of elections." Gold,
supra note 7, at 431; Grendell v. Ohio EPA, 146 Ohio App. 3d 1, 10-13 (9th Dist. 2001)
(discussing the history of Sections 4 and 6).
182. Sterk & Goldman, supra note 9, at 1333-39 (extensively discussing judicial
doctrines and explanations for permitting public debt); see also Oesterle, supra note 9, at
615-17 (discussing the Colorado Supreme Court's interpretation of state constitutional
fiscal restraints); e.g., State ex rel. Saxbe v. Brand, 176 Ohio St. 44,197 N.E.2d 328 (1964).
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municipalities to wholly construct railroads' and streets,18 4 which
some considered beyond the Ohio constitutional delegates' intent.
Municipalities could even sell these wholly constructed projects to
private interests at a later date if, in good faith, they did not intend to
do so originally." Also, Ohio courts permitted public lending of aid
or credit to nonprofit organizations.m Notwithstanding these judicial
carve-outs, §§4, 6 continued to prohibit the government from lending
its credit to for-profit entities.
Following the rise of Keynesian economics, some scholars
approved deficit spending in good times and addressed issues
regarding public finance and constitutional fiscal restraints from that
perspective." Public financing for private projects-now called
"Industrial or Economic Development"-became more popular in
the 1950s and 1960s.'89 In 1963, the Ohio General Assembly passed
an act to, among other things, authorize loans to for-profit private
businesses, which the Ohio Supreme Court struck down as
unconstitutional.'90 In response, in 1965, the Ohio General Assembly
183. Walker, 21 Ohio St. at 56.
184. City of Newark v. Fromholtz, 102 Ohio St. 81, 130 N.E. 561 (1921).
185. Gold, supra note 7, at 415 ("The general tenor of the debates was to the effect
that constitutional debt limitations would prevent all forms of state involvement in
economic enterprise.").
186. City of Cincinnati v. Dexter, 55 Ohio St. 93,44 N.E. 520 (1896).
187. State ex. rel Leaverton v. Kerns, 104 Ohio St. 550, 136 N.E. 217 (1922) (stating (in
dicta) that Sections 4 and 6 do not prohibit donations of tax revenue to nonprofit
corporations, in this case an agricultural society formerly organized as a for-profit entity);
State ex rel. Dickman v. Defenbacher, 164 Ohio St. 142, 128 N.E.2d 59 (1955) (veteran's
association); Bazell v. Cincinnati, 13 Ohio St. 2d 63, 72 (1968) (citing Kerns in holding that
Cincinnati may lend its credit to Hamilton County).
188. BUCHANAN & WAGNER, supra note 26, at 8.10.11-8.10.24 ("Balance Budget at
Full Employment").
189. Gold, supra note 7, at 445-46. E.g. State ex rel. Bruestle v. Rich, 159 Ohio St. 13,
110 N.E. 2d 778 (1953) (upholding a urban redevelopment plan under OHIO CONST. art.
VIII §6); State ex rel. McElroy v. Baron, 169 Ohio St. 439, 160 N.E.2d 10 (1959)
(upholding legislation enabling local governments to construct and operate port facilities
to be leased to private entities under OHIO CONST. art. VIII §6).
190. State ex rel. Saxbe v. Brand, 176 Ohio St. 44, 52, 197 N.E.2d 328, 333 (1964)
(invaliding OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 121.13 to § 121.36, inclusive, which were enacted
under H.B. 270, 130 Ohio Laws 42); Gongwer's Ohio Report (Dec. 8, 1964).
Walter White (R-Allen) explained that the Resolution (S.J.R.1) is the
result of the Supreme Court's decision declaring the financing
provisions of H.B. 270, passed by the 105th General Assembly,
unconstitutional. This makes the provisions part of the Constitution,
White said. White told the House members that Ohio is in
proposed and voters approved Ohio Const. Art. VIII §13, which
expands the scope of permissible public investment in the private
sector.'9' Specifically, §13 permits self-liquidating public debt
issuances for capital projects for a "public purpose,"" and
significantly exempts such debt issuances from the public investment
restraints in §§4, 6.'
The Transaction crosses the boundary Ohio voters set forth in
1965 to violate both the spirit and letter of Art. VIII §§4, 6 and 13
competition with other states for industry, and many of the states (44)
have some type of financing to aid industry in construction of facilities.
Id.
191. GONGWER OHIO (Nov. 17, 1964); Gold, supra note 7, at 448. Despite mirroring
the constitutional language in large part, the ballot proposal language for Section 13 is
somewhat difficult to understand. Am. S.J. Res. 1, 130 Ohio Laws spec. sess. 1964. As it
appears in Am. S.J. Res. 1, the ballot language for Section 13 reads as follows:
Proposing to amend Article VIII of the Constitution of the State of
Ohio by adding Section 13 to provide that to create jobs and
employment opportunities and improve the economic welfare of the
people, it is in the public interest and a proper public purpose for the
State and other designated agencies of the State to acquire, construct,
enlarge, improve or equip, and to sell, lease, exchange and otherwise
dispose of property, structures, equipment and facilities for industry,
commerce, distribution and research; to make and guarantee loans,
and to borrow money and issue bonds or other obligations, to provide
moneys for such purposes; to exclude the application of certain
sections of Article VIII and Article XII; to authorize laws to carry
such purposes into effect; to provide that moneys raised by taxation
shall not be obligated or pledged; to provide that no guarantees, loans
or lending of aid or credit shall be made under laws enacted pursuant
to or validated by such amendment for facilities to be constructed for
the purpose of providing electric or gas utility service to the public; to
authorize corporations to lend or contribute moneys; and to validate
certain laws enacted by the 105h General Assembly.
Id. Separately, according the Ohio Department of Development, Ohio spent $1.02 billion
on economic development incentives in 2010. Ohio Department of Development, 2010
Annual Report, (Dec. 1, 2010), pg. 2, http://www.development.ohio.gov/Department
Reports/documents/201OAnnualReport.pdf.
192. "Self-liquidating" is used here to mean those "projects which will directly yield to
the government a money return sufficient to service and to amortize the debt."
BUCHANAN, supra note 107, at 2.12.35.
193. As "moneys raised by taxation" may not be used to repay debt incurred pursuant
to §13, presumably §13 is designed to specifically facilitate self-liquidating capital
investment.
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(hereinafter "§4," "§6" and "§13").'94 First of all, private funds
organized to build the Arena after voters rejected five separate ballot
proposals to publicly fund a sports arena, such that public investment
is unnecessary and even harmful to a fair business environment.
Second, the Transaction benefits private investors in the short term,
but has not been shown to provide a positive return on investment or
ensure the long-term viability of CBJ or Columbus' downtown Arena
District.'5 As noted above, if a sports arena was not a good private
investment for Nationwide, which invests heavily in the Arena
District, there is little reason to believe the Arena will be a good
public investment. Third, public investment in the Arena District
benefits parts of the Franklin County tax base while alienating others.
Thus, the Transaction displays the very evils delegates to Ohio's 1850-
51 constitutional convention sought to avoid.
B. The Transaction's Lawfulness Under the Ohio Constitution
The Transaction's financing structure violates Ohio
Constitutional restraints on debt and public investment in the private
sector.' This section will: (1) explain the Transaction's structure; (2)
explain how the Transaction violates the Ohio Constitution; and (3)
refute counterarguments attempting to provide legal authority for the
Transaction.
1. The Structure of the Transaction
The Transaction is structured in a very complex manner, as
shown in Exhibit A. Prior to the Transaction's closing, preparation of
the final documents and release of those documents to the public,
public officials including Columbus City Council, Mayor Michael
Coleman, the State of Ohio, the Franklin County Commissioners and
the Franklin County Convention Facilities Authority ("FCCFA")
authorized funding for the Transaction.
Prior to the Transaction, the FCCFA owned the real estate
where the Arena is located, which is referred to as the "Project
194. The spirit of the Ohio Constitution is relevant to this analysis due to the following
canon of statutory interpretation: "[The Ohio Constitution] is to be construed according to
its intention, where that is clear. Walker v. City of Cincinnati, 21 Ohio St. 14, 53
(1871).
195. See infra Pt. III(C).
196. See generally OHIO CONST. art. VIII.
197. Sullivan and Caruso, supra note 123.
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Site."l98 The FCCFA leased the Project Site to the Capital South
Community Redevelopment Corporation, which in turn leased the
real estate to a Nationwide affiliate.' At the Project Site,
Nationwide constructed the Arena together with associated parking
and practice facilities, and spaces for commercial offices and
restaurants, or what is known as the "Project."a In turn, Nationwide
leased the Arena to CBJ pursuant to an arm's length agreement that
required CBJ to pay rent 20'
The Transaction alters the existing structure in the following
manner:20 First, to fund the Transaction, the FCCFA issued revenue
bonds to Nationwide to obtain roughly $44 million.'" Second, the
FCCFA obtained a loan from the State of Ohio (put into effect
through a bond issuance) that provided the FCCFA with $10 million
in additional funds.2m The loan was issued at a 1.00% interest rate
and half of the loan amount, $5 million, is forgivable upon timely
payment.05 Third, the FCCFA entered into a circular Lease and
Sublease with Columbus and Franklin County.20 The Lease and
198. Lease Agreement Between the Franklin County Convention Facilities Authority,
Lessor, and the City of Columbus, Ohio and the County of Franklin, Lessees (Feb. 1,
2012) (hereinafter "Lease Agreement"), page 1.
199. Id. The Nationwide affiliate is Nationwide Arena LLC.
200. Id.
201. NALLC-COLHOC Sublease and Management Agreement.
202. To outline the Transaction at the Columbus City Council meeting on Oct. 3, 2011,
Attorney John Rosenberger noted that the FCCFA "published" Franklin County
Convention Facilities Finance Subcommittee, NATIONWIDE ARENA PROPOSAL
SUMMARY REPORT, at 17, http://council.columbus.gov/uploadedFiles/City-Council/News/
Releases/201 1/FinalReport-JohnRosenberger91411.pdf.
203. CFA Resolution 2012-6 ("Bond Resolution"), Section 6. Section 17 of the Bond
Resolution also provides for issuing additional bonds in the future. The $44 million figure
includes a credit towards the purchase of the Arena that the FCCFA received in return for
issuing bonds to Nationwide. Id. at Section 5.
204. Bond Resolution, Section 6(a) ("First Lien Project Bonds); Loan Agreement
between The Director of Development of the State of Ohio and Franklin County
Convention Facilities Authority, Section 1.2 ("Loan Amount" means Ten Million Dollars
("10,000,000)).
205. Loan Agreement, Section 1.2 (defining "Annual Forgiveness Amount"); Exhibit
A-1 (noting 1.00% interest); Exhibit A-3 (repayment schedule).
206. Lease Agreement, Section 1.01 (defining "Lessees Rent" as earmarked casino tax
receipts), Section 3.01 (defining Lease Payments as Lessees Rent). Sublease Agreement
Between the City of Columbus, Ohio and the County of Franklin, Lessors, and the
Franklin County Convention Facilities Authority, Lessee (Feb. 1, 2010) (hereinafter
"Sublease Agreement"), Section 3.01 (defining "CFA Rental Payment" as $10, which is a
nominal sum). Under Section 2.01 of the Lease and Section 2.01 of the Sublease, the
property transferred back and forth between the parties is identically defined as "Lease
Premises," which has the same meaning under each agreement. Because the rent under
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Sublease are designed not to transfer any property interests, but
simply to transfer to the FCCFA casino tax revenue that Columbus
and Franklin County receive pursuant to the Ohio Constitution.'
The "rent" (i.e., casino tax revenue) that the FCCFA receives from
Columbus and Franklin County is used to service the bonds issued to
Nationwide and the State of Ohio as well as to manage the Arena.2
In fact, the FCCFA Bond Resolution defines "Lessee's Rent" with
reference to the Lease Agreement, thereby making explicit that
casino tax revenue is repaying the bonds and financing the
Transaction.20
Fourth, Nationwide transferred its interest in the Project and the
Project Site to the FCCFA for $42.5 million, which is financed as
described in the first three steps above.210 Whereas the steps already
described finance the Transaction and transfer title, the next steps
subsidize CBJ.
Fifth, the Transaction replaced the existing lease between
Nationwide and CBJ, with a new Use Agreement between the
FCCFA and CBJ.'" Under the Use Agreement, CBJ pays no rent
and maintains the right to use the Arena to meet the needs of an
NHL franchise."' CBJ's right to use the Arena is curtailed during
the Sublease is a nominal sum, the effect of the Lease and Sublease is simply to transfer
casino tax revenue from the City and County to the FCCFA.
207. OHIO CONST. art. XV, § 6.
208. Bond Resolution, Section 12, Section 13.
209. Bond Resolution, Section 1 (defining "Lessee's Rent"), Section 7 (creating
"Lease Payments Fund"), Sections 12 & 13 (providing for repayment of bonds); Lease
Agreement (noting that Lessee's Rent goes to accounts within the Lease Payments Fund).
210. Purchase and Sale Agreement, Section 4.
211. Arena Use License Agreement by and between Franklin County Convention
Facilities Authority and COLHOC Limited Partnership (Mar. 28, 2012) (hereinafter "Use
Agreement").
212. Use Agreement, Section 5.1 and Section 5.2 (explaining the "public purpose" for
the Transaction); see Use Agreement Article 5 and Article 6. There is not only no
provision for rent under the Use Agreement, but the Use Agreement also shifts CBJ costs
to the public sector. Use Agreement, at 2 ("WHEREAS, the Team acknowledges that the
Team's costs and expenses for its use of the Arena under this Agreement are an
accommodation to the Team to induce the Team to continue to use the Arena for its
Home Games."); see also Jarman supra note 83 (stating that CBJ pays no rent as a result
of the Transaction). The extent to which existing CBJ liabilities and future Arena
expenses are shifted to the public is not currently available because the FCCFA did not
fully disclose exhibits identified in Articles 5 and 6 to the Use Agreement, although
Exhibit 5.2 to the Use Agreement provides for evenly splitting losses between CBJ and
CAM for twelve month period preceding the Transaction. Significantly, under the Use
Agreement, CBJ maintains the right to: enter into third party vendor agreements; sell the
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nights where no hockey games are scheduled, but CBJ retains access
to the facilities as well as many other rights."'
Sixth, the Transaction created a new entity, Columbus Arena
Management LLC ("CAM"), to manage the Arena. Under the
Management Agreement, CAM manages the Arena, using casino tax
revenue to operate the Arena and make capital improvements.' An
Ohio State representative is the "Arena Manager" and Ohio State
entered into an "Ohio State Sub-Management Agreement" with
CAM, but Ohio State's role is uncertain because it receives no
management fee.216 Additionally, details surrounding a revenue
sharing agreement were redacted from the Sub-Management
Agreement that the FCCFA did disclose.217 As noted above, the
Transaction is designed in part to limit competition between Ohio
State's Jerome Schottenstein Center and Nationwide Arena in order
to limit costs associated with attracting non-hockey and non-Ohio
State events to Columbus.218
Other agreements and documents should be noted as well. As
part of the Transaction, Nationwide renegotiated the current
Arena naming rights; sell advertising at the Arena; sell broadcast rights; and to negotiate
premium seat contracts with third parties. Use Agreement, Article 5.
213. Use Agreement, Article 8 ("Grant of Use Rights").
214. Arena Management Agreement by and between Franklin County Convention
Facilities Authority and Columbus Arena Management LLC (hereinafter "Management
Agreement"); Operating Agreement of Columbus Arena Management LLC (not dated or
signed and executed). Under the Management Agreement, the "Arena Manager Board"
appoints an Arena Manager (i.e., an individual to manage the Arena). Management
Agreement, Section 2.2. The Arena Manager Board consists of the CAM Managers.
Management Agreement, Section 5.6.
215. Management Agreement, Section 8.2, Section 8.3. The Management Agreement
expressly shows that casino tax revenue will be used to manage the Arena. Management
Agreement, Section 12.3. The Arena Manager does not collect any management fee
under the Management Agreement. Management Agreement, Article 6 ("No
Management Fee"). CAM also provides funds in the event that casino tax revenue and
state loan proceeds are insufficient to manage the Arena. Operating Agreement, Articles
III-IV.
216. The Arena Manager does not collect any management fee under the
Management Agreement. Management Agreement, Article 6 ("No Management Fee").
CAM also provides funds in the event that casino tax revenue and state loan proceeds are
insufficient to manage the Arena. Operating Agreement, Articles III-IV. Ohio State
receives no management fee pursuant to the Sub-Management Agreement. Arena Sub-
Management Agreement between Columbus Arena Management LLC and The Ohio
State University, Section 5.2 (hereinafter "Sub-Management Agreement").
217. Appendix C to Arena Sub-Management Agreement: Non Hockey Event
Scheduling and Revenue Distribution Procedures. See also discussion supra Part
II(A)(2)(iii); Pyle, supra note 95.
218. See Pyle, supra note 95.
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property tax exemption for the Arena to extend beyond the original
2015 expiration date.2 " Also, Nationwide paid $28 million for
continued naming rights of the Arena and $52 million for a 30%
ownership interest in the now-subsidized CBJ.220  Attorneys for
Columbus, Franklin County and the FCCFA all provided legal
opinions contending that parts of the Transaction are legal or
otherwise within the authority of public bodies, but no attorney or
law firm provided an opinion regarding the Transaction as a whole.221
Lastly, Columbus, Franklin County, and the FCCFA all issued
ordinances and resolutions agreeing to enter into the Transaction or
authorizing representatives to negotiate the Transaction.222 While the
structure of the Transaction is complex, it is essential to the analysis
provided below.
2. The Nationwide Arena Transaction
The Transaction is unconstitutional because it violates Ohio
Const. Article VIII §§4, 6 and does not fall within an exception under
219. See Bell, supra note 121, at 38. Under a prior agreement with Columbus schools,
Nationwide pays $1 million to Columbus City Schools to compensate for its 99% property
tax abatement through 2015. Id. After 2015, the Arena (i.e., Project Site) will remain free
from property tax, but Nationwide will discontinue its annual $1 million payment. Id.
Columbus City Schools were set to receive $2.7 million after 2015, based on a 2011
valuation of the arena. Id.
220. See Caruso supra note 2.
221. Attorneys representing public bodies that are parties to the Transaction each
approved only a portion of the Transaction, even though all documents must be read
together to understand the Transaction. Peck Shaffer & Williams LLP Letter Dated
March 28, 2012 ("The Project Bonds constitute valid and binding special obligations of the
Authority *** the Project Bonds do not represent or constitute a debt or pledge of the
faith or credit, or taxing power, of the Authority, the State of Ohio ,or any political
subdivision thereof"); Dinsmore & Shohl LLP Letter Dated March 28, 2012 (discussing
the loan and real estate documents, but deferring to Peck Shaffer, the Bond Counsel for
the FCCFA, regarding other matters); Ron O'Brien, Franklin County Prosecutor, Letter
Dated March 28, 2012 ("The County is authorized by the laws of the State of Ohio to
enter into and perform its obligations under the Lease and Sublease"); Richard C. Pfeiffer,
Jr., Columbus City Attorney, Letter Dated March 28,2012 ("The City is authorized by the
laws of the State of Ohio and the City's Charter to enter into and perform its obligations
under the Lease and Sublease).
222. City of Columbus Ordinance No. 1596-2011, http://columbus.legistar.com/
LegislationDetail.aspx?ID=987519&GUID=102332F9-FE91-44FD-8B35-A388B30E526F;
County of Franklin Resolution No. 0938-11, http://crms.franklincountyohio.gov/RMSWeb/
pdfs/Resolutions/r_000004524/resolution-published.pdf; Franklin County Convention
Facilities Authority Resolution 2011-27 (authorizing the FCCFA to apply for a State of
Ohio loan); Franklin County Convention Facilities Authority Resolution 2011-28
(authorizing the FCCFA to issue bonds to purchase the Arena); FCCFA Resolution 2012-
6 (detailing the bond issuances); and FCCFA Resolution 2012-8 (authorizing FCCFA
officials to execute other agreement necessary for the Transaction).
Art. VIII §13. Sections 4 and 6 prohibit the State and its political
subdivisions from lending its credit to or entering into a joint venture
with a private for-profit corporation.223 Courts interpret §§4, 6 in the
same manner, but with §4 applying to the State and §6 applying to
cities, counties and municipalities." To facilitate capital investment
in self-liquidating capital projects, Ohio voters adopted Ohio Const.
Art. VIII §13, which permits a public authority to issue revenue debt
when the debt obligation is repaid with funds other than "moneys
raised by taxation" (e.g., funds from income-producing assets).22
Significantly, §13 exempts debt issuances made pursuant to §13 from
the §§4, 6 restrictions on public investment in the private sector.226 To
223. OHIO CONST. art. VIII §6 provides in pertinent part:
No laws shall be passed authorizing any county, city, town or
township, by vote of its citizens, or otherwise, to become a stockholder
in any joint stock company, corporation, or association whatever; or to
raise money for, or to loan its credit to, or in aid of, any such company,
corporation, or association.
Id. OHIO CONST. art. VIII §4 provides the following:
The credit of the state shall not, in any manner, be given or loaned to,
or in aid of, any individual association or corporation whatever; nor
shall the state ever hereafter become a joint owner, or stockholder, in
any company or association in this state, or elsewhere, formed for any
purpose whatever.
Id.
224. Gold, supra note 7, at 460 (citing State ex rel. Eichenberger v. Neff, 42 Ohio App.
2d 69, 74, 330 N.E.2d 454, 459 (1974)).
225. OHIO CONST. art. VIII §13 also enables public investment in private enterprise.
Id. at 463 ("The immediate purpose of section 13 was to permit the government to use the
proceeds of revenue-bond sales for loans and loan guarantees to private business.").
226. OHIO CONST. art. VIII § 13 provides in pertinent part:
To create or preserve jobs and employment opportunities, to improve
the economic welfare of the people of the state, to control air, water,
and thermal pollution, or to dispose of solid waste, it is hereby
determined to be in the public interest and a proper public purpose for
the state or its political subdivisions, taxing districts, or public
authorities, its or their agencies or instrumentalities, or corporations
not for profit designated by any of them as such agencies or
instrumentalities, to acquire, construct, enlarge, improve, or equip,
and to sell, lease, exchange, or otherwise dispose of property,
structures, equipment, and facilities within the State of Ohio for
industry, commerce, distribution, and research, to make or guarantee
loans and to borrow money and issue bonds or other obligations to
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maintain this exception to §§4, 6, however, §13 directs that the debt
obligation must not be repaid with "moneys raised by taxation" and
that the debt proceeds may not be used to fund operating expenses. '
A political subdivision may not lend its credit to or enter into a
joint venture with a for-profit private enterprise when moneys raised
by taxation are pledged by the political subdivision to repay debt.228
In State ex. rel Ryan v. City Council of Gahanna, the City of Gahanna
issued bonds to purchase land that would be leased to private for-
profit businesses at below-market rates.22 9 The bonds were a general
obligation of Gahanna, but the city also earmarked separate funds
raised by a tax levy to service the debt.230
In Ryan, the Ohio Supreme Court's findings were twofold: First,
the court found that the transaction at issue, a below-market lease
provide moneys for the acquisition, construction, enlargement,
improvement, or equipment, of such property, structures, equipment
and facilities. Laws may be passed to carry into effect such purposes
and to authorize for such purposes the borrowing of money by, and
the issuance of bonds or other obligations of, the state, or its political
subdivisions, taxing districts, or public authorities, its or their agencies
or instrumentalities, or corporations not for profit designated by any
of them as such agencies or instrumentalities, and to authorize the
making of guarantees and loans and the lending of aid and credit,
which laws, bonds, obligations, loans, guarantees, and lending of aid
and credit shall not be subject to the requirements, limitations, or
prohibitions of any other section of Article VIII, or of Article XII,
Sections 6 and 11, of the Constitution, provided that moneys raised by
taxation shall not be obligated or pledged for the payment of bonds or




228. State ex rel. Ryan v. City Council of Gahanna, 9 Ohio St. 3d 126, 128-29, 459
N.E.2d 208, 210-11 (1984); See also State ex rel. Bruestle v. Rich, 159 Ohio St. 13, 110 N.E.
2d 778 (1953). In Bruestle, discussed extensively in the pleadings in Ryan, the Court
upheld a plan in which the federal government provided funds for the City of Cincinnati to
clear and redevelop blighted property, which was later sold to private developers. Id. at
13-14. Because the City's purchase of the property and sale to private developers were at
arm's-length, the Court held that there was no lending of credit or joinder of public and
private property under OHIO CONST. art. VIII § 6. Id. at 34-35. Moreover, notes issued
to secure the property were repaid with non-tax revenue. Id. at 13-15; See also State ex
rel. McElroy v. Baron, 169 Ohio St. 439, 160 N.E.2d 10 (1959). Again in McElroy, there is
no indication that a government leased property at favorable or below-market rates. Id. at
444-45. Further, both Bruestle and McElroy pre-date State ex rel. Saxbe v. Brand, in which
the Ohio Supreme Court extensively defined "lending of credit" under OHIO CONST. art.
VIII, discussed infra.
229. Ryan, 9 Ohio St. 3d at 126.
230. Id. at 126, 129.
arrangement, created a corporate joint venture between Gahanna
and private businesses that violated §6.231 In so finding, the court
looked to the "realities of the project" and determined that the lands
were being restored primarily to provide businesses with land rather
than to develop blighted urban areas." The financing was below-
market because the businesses contracting with Gahanna at favorable
rates in Ryan could not have obtained similarly favorable rates from
private developers." Second, the court found that the transaction
used moneys raised by taxation by setting aside funds to service the
debt, even though the debt was a general obligation of the city."4 The
court noted: "It is the pledge of tax revenue which makes the notes or
bonds issued by the respondents an unconstitutional act.""' The
transaction in Ryan violated the Ohio Constitution because the
financing arrangement violated §6 and the §13 exception did not
apply because Gahanna pledged moneys raised by taxation."
In addition, the Ohio Supreme Court has provided extensive
guidance to define "lending of credit" as it relates to §§4, 6. Although
231. Id. at 128-29.
232. Id.
233. Id. Similarly, in personal property tax and real property tax cases, the Ohio
Supreme Court has determined that the best indicator of true value is a recent arm's-
length sale. Shiloh Automotive, Inc. v. Levin, 117 Ohio St. 3d 4, 20 (2008); e.g., Grabler
Mfg. Co. v. Kosydar (1975), 43 Ohio St. 2d 75 (sale price constituted value of personalty);
Bedford Bd. of Educ. v. Cuyahoga County Bd. of Revision, 2012-Ohio-2844, 19 (real
property).
234. Ryan, 9 Ohio St. 3d at 129.
235. Id.
236. In dicta, the Ryan court identified methods Gahanna could have used to
constitutionally structure the transaction. The court stated that the deal would not have
been unconstitutional had the city organized an OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §1728 urban
redevelopment corporation to purchase and lease out the land. Ryan, 9 Ohio St. 3d. at
129. However, the Court did not condone corporate joint ventures created with below-
market leases with this statement because 1728 organizations must sell or lease land at
"fair value." R.C. §1728.03. Under the facts of Ryan, a 1728 organization could not have
leased the land at below-market rates. In addition, using a 1728 organization as a conduit
to purchase and lease land does not escape the express prohibition on pledging moneys
raised by taxation. Ryan, 9 Ohio St. 3d at 129. To support this point, the Court identified
public bonds that could be constitutionally issued under the facts of Ryan, which were
bonds created under statutes requiring repayment with non-tax revenues (e.g., private
rents) rather than moneys raised by taxation. R.C. §725.05 (stating that only funds
identified in R.C. §725.01 may be used to service urban renewal bonds, which funding
includes "all proceeds of the sale or other disposition of property of the municipal
corporation in any part or all of one or more urban renewal areas; and all urban renewal
service payments collected from any part or all of one or more urban renewal areas.");
R.C. §761.07 ("but such bonds shall be payable solely from the revenue derived from the
sale or lease of projects or by funds derived from the issuance of refunding bonds").
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§13's constitutional enactment overruled the holding of State ex rel.
Saxbe v. Brand," the case continues to validly define "lending of aid
and credit" under H§ 4, 6. Lending the State's credit includes:
providing a private entity with the ability to borrow; lending actual
funds to a private entity; or in the extreme case, possibly a direct
grant of funds."' Moreover, lending the State's credit does not
require that the State incur indebtedness." Notably, Brand
recognizes that revenue bonds constitute lending the State's credit
even though they do not pledge funds outside an identifiable revenue
stream.4 In Brand, extending the State's borrowing and lending
power to for-profit businesses with nothing received in return
constituted lending the State's credit.242
a. The Transaction Violates §4 or §6
The Transaction violates §4 or §6 because state and local
government bodies "loan its credit to, or in aid of" CBJ, which is a
for-profit enterprise, through the Use Agreement.2 43  The Use
237. State ex rel. Petroleum Underground Storage Tank Release Co, 62 Ohio St. 3d
111, 114 (1991).
238. State ex rel. Saxbe v. Brand, 176 Ohio St. 44, 46-52, 197 N.E.2d 328 (1964) ("It is
sufficient to recognize that that word in that section includes within its meaning (1) a loan
of money and (2) the ability to borrow or borrowing power (i.e., the ability to acquire
something tangible in exchange for a promise to pay for it."). See discussion in Gold supra
note 7, at 447-48.
239. Brand, 176 Ohio St. at 52. In an early case, the Ohio Supreme Court noted that
direct grants of funds violate the spirit of §6. Markley v. Village of Mineral City, 58 Ohio
St. 430, 438 (1898). See also Gold, supra note 7, at 444.
240. Brand, 176 Ohio St. at 52 (stating that "the sale of revenue bonds of the state to
raise money necessarily involves a borrowing of money even though no indebtedness of
the state results. If the bonds are not paid, the borrowing power of the state will as a
result be adversely affected, even though the bonds do not represent a debt of the state").
See also Oesterle supra note 9, at 613-14.
241. Brand, 176 Ohio St. at 52.
242. Id. at 50.
243. OHIO CONST. art. VIII §4 provides, in pertinent part:
No laws shall be passed authorizing any county, city, town or
township, by vote of its citizens, or otherwise, to become a stockholder
in any joint stock company, corporation, or association whatever; or to
raise money for, or to loan its credit to, or in aid of, any such company,
corporation, or association * * *."
Id. OHIO CONST. art. VIII §6 provides, in pertinent part: "The credit of the state shall not,
in any manner, be given or loaned to, or in aid of, any individual association or
corporation whatever * * *." Id.
Agreement, under which CBJ pays no rent, is a below-market
arrangement that lends government credit to CBJ or in aid of CBJ.244
Stated differently, the Transaction creates an impermissible joint
venture that includes the FCCFA, Columbus, Franklin County,
Nationwide and CBJ.245
The FCCFA is lending government credit with a below-market
use arrangement to benefit the for-profit CBJ, 246 which is prohibited
under Ryan and Brand. Pursuant to the circular Lease and Sublease,
the FCCFA obtains casino tax revenue from Columbus and Franklin
County.247 In turn, the casino tax revenue is used to repay funds
borrowed from Nationwide and the State of Ohio.2 48 With its newly
acquired funds, the FCCFA purchases, operates, and makes capital
improvements to the Arena to benefit CBJ.24' Simply put, the casino
tax revenue is funneled through the FCCFA to subsidize CBJ.
The Transaction is properly characterized as a lending of aid or
credit because, as in Ryan, it is a below-market arrangement that
benefits CBJ with government assistance, but does not provide a
cognizable benefit to the FCCFA or other public entities.25 Consider
244. Use Agreement, Section 5.1 and Section 5.2 (explaining the "public purpose" for
the Transaction); see Use Agreement Article 5 and Article 6. See text and accompanying
notes supra note 212.
245. State ex rel. Ryan v. City Council of Gahanna, 9 Ohio St. 3d 126, 129-30, 459
N.E.2d 208 (1984) ("A municipal corporation may not enter into a joint venture with, nor
extend credit to, a private corporation or association where such venture or extension is
supported by the issuance and sale of bonds or notes, guaranteed by earmarked tax
revenue of the municipal corporation.").
246. Id.
247. Lease Agreement, Section 1.01 (defining "Lessee's Rent" as earmarked casino tax
receipts), Section 3.01 (defining "Lease Payment" as Lessee's Rent).
248. Bond Resolution, Section 1 (defining "Lessee's Rent" with reference to the Lease
Agreement), Section 12-13 (explaining the use of bond proceeds).
249. Bond Resolution, Section 12-13.
250. Ryan, 9 Ohio St. 3d. at 129.
The respondents have leased the property financed by the notes,
which were issued in anticipation of long-term bonds, at a favorable
rate to private corporations. This is as much a joint enterprise as if the
city of Gahanna had given the money directly to the corporations to
develop the land, to construct their buildings and to carry on their
activities in the industrial park.
Id. But see Use Agreement, Section 5.1-5.2 (explaining the indirect "public purpose" for
the Transaction without providing a return on investment calculation). In the
constitutional analysis, CBJ's agreement to play its home games at Nationwide Arena
through 2039 cannot be considered adequate consideration for the benefits in receives
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that the new Use Agreement provides similar benefits to CBJ as
under the pre-Transaction lease, but at a $9.5 million per year
discount."' To be sure, the Transaction does not involve a lease
agreement, but rather a use agreement, which incorporates fewer
property rights than a lease agreement. That the Transaction utilizes
a use agreement rather than a lease agreement, however, cannot
explain this great discount as an arm's length transaction. CBJ still
receives benefits from the Arena sufficient to satisfy an NHL hockey
team's needs, just as it did under the original lease.m And as the Use
Agreement is much more favorable to CBJ than the original arm's
length lease, any property rights that CBJ surrenders as a result of the
Transaction are too insignificant to justify the Use Agreement as an
arm's length agreement."' The rent-free Use Agreement with CBJ is
therefore a below-market arrangement that lends government aid or
credit because CBJ could not have obtained the arrangement from a
private developer, which is clear in this case because Lamar Hunt
failed to secure a more favorable Arena lease than the lease John f.
McConnell negotiated in arm's-length negotiations with Nationwide in
1997.254
General references to facility leases between municipalities and
NHL franchises in other jurisdictions cannot establish the market
because the Ryan Court rejected arguments attempting to justify below-market
transactions for a "public purpose" as constitutional under sections 4 and 6. Ryan, 9 Ohio
St. 3d. at 130 ("It was never argued herein that urban renewal and economic development
are not "proper public purposes." To the contrary, participation in such projects by local
governments has long been given legislative recognition and encouragement.").
251. Compare NALLC-COLHOC Sublease and Management Agreement, Article 4
(providing rent terms totaling millions of dollars), with Use Agreement Sections 5.1 and
5.2 (omitting any rent term). Reports have also reported that the Transaction will save
CBJ $9.5 million on an annual basis. FCCFA Report, supra note 202, at 12.
252. Use Agreement, Article 8 ("Grant of Use Rights").
253. The Use Agreement is extremely favorable to CBJ, not just because CBJ does not
pay rent or incur operating expenses, but also because CBJ maintains access to the Arena
and its use during both the Hockey and Non-Hockey season. Use Agreement, Article 8.
As might be expected, CBJ has considerably more access to the Arena during the Hockey
Season. Id. Also, the Use Agreement gives CBJ rights to Arena Naming Rights, rights to
the Team to display its Name, Logo and Schedule throughout the Arena, rights to
advertise in the Arena, rights to control broadcasting hockey events, and rights to
premium seat contracts. Use Agreement, Sections 5.5-5.9. The Use Agreement does
obligate CBJ to stay in Columbus through 2039, but this agreement cannot constitute
consideration under §§4,6 because this argument is too tenuous to show value and the
Ohio Supreme Court rejected this "public purpose" argument in Ryan. Ryan, 9 Ohio St.
3d at 130.
254. McConnell v. Hunt Sports, 132 Ohio App. 3d 657, 668 (1999). See discussion
supra Part II(A)(2)(i).
better than specific evidence of the market rate in this case (i.e., an
arm's length transaction)."' Moreover, FCCFA Executive Director
William Jennison publicly advertised the renegotiated lease as a
below-market arrangement when he stated, "No one is pretending
that the publicly owned arena will make money."256 Thus, there is
strong evidence that the Transaction is a below-market arrangement
that lends government aid or credit to CBJ in violation of §§4, 6.
b. Section 13 Does Not Authorize the Transaction's Debt Issue
Notwithstanding the §§4, 6 violation, the Transaction could pass
constitutional muster if it fell within an exception to §§4, 6 provided
under Ohio Const. Art. VIII §13.257 The Transaction, however, does
not fall within the §13 exception. Section 13 exempts certain revenue
debt from constitutional debt limits so long as "moneys raised by
taxation" are not used to repay the debt.258 The revenue debt
contemplated by §13 is debt serviced by income producing assets or
non-tax revenues such as user fees and fines.259 For example, a
building financed with private rents might utilize revenue bonds. By
contrast, Ohio Const. Art. XV §6 identifies casino receipts as moneys
raised by taxation, thereby placing the Transaction outside §13 and
subjecting the Transaction to §§4, 6.
As another independent §13 violation, the proceeds from the
bond issuance are impermissibly going to fund operating expenses for
the Arena. Section 13 lists several purposes that debt issuances made
pursuant to §13 may fund.2 o However, none of those purposes
255. See, e.g., Buser, supra note 42, at 8 ("A leading consultant for the NHL,
MZSports, has examined alternative forms of financial benefits that NHL cities typically
provide. Based on that analysis, the Blue Jackets are at a competitive disadvantage in the
amount of approximately $12 million per year compared to the net benefit provided to the
average NHL team.").
256. FCCFA Executive Director William Jennison stated, "No one is pretending that
the publicly owned arena will make money." Bush and Caruso, supra note 162.
257. State ex rel. Ryan v. City Council of Gahanna, 9 Ohio St. 3d 126, 129, 459 N.E.2d
208 (1984) ("The respondents must comply with Section 13 because of the joint venture
between the municipal corporation and private corporations or associations.").
258. OHIO CONST. art. VIII §13. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 351 (West 2012) (citing
§13).
259. See Ryan, 9 Ohio. St. 3d at 129 (citing OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §725 and §761,
which pledge non-tax revenues to service bond issues as constitutional debt issues under
§13). See also Gold, supra note 7, at 453 n. 240-41 (citing an interview with the Director of
the Ohio Department of Development and media reports that §13 was not designed or
billed as permitting tax revenues to be pledged to finance projects).
260, OHIo CONST. art. VIII §13. Notably, there is a limit on "public purpose" as
defined under §13. C.I.V.I.C. Group v. City of Warren, 88 Ohio St. 3d 37, 41 (2001)
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include operating expenses and, as such, aid for operating expenses is
presumably not a permissible purpose within §13.6" From a policy
perspective, this restriction is intuitive because debt, which obligates
future generations, should fund capital investment rather than
consumption in order to match costs and benefits of public goods
over time. As operating expenses constitute spending for current
period consumption, operating expenses should not be funded with
public debt that burdens future generations. Thus, it is unlikely that
§13 authorizes public investment in noncapital projects such as
operating expenses."'
Here, the FCCFA resolution outlining the bond issuances
specifically provides that bond proceeds will go towards the fund for
operating expenses for the Arena.' As the bond proceeds fund
operating expenses, §13 is violated on a second ground. Accordingly,
§13's exception from the §§4, 6 restriction on public investment in
private enterprise does not apply and the Transaction is
unconstitutional for violating §§4, 6.
3. Refuting Counterarguments
The law firm Peck, Shaffer and Williams LLP, bond counsel for
the Transaction, has presented several arguments attempting to
uphold the Transaction as constitutional. Upon sending an earlier
draft of this article to the Franklin County Commissioners, Franklin
County Commissioner John O'Grady sent me a letter from Peck
Shaffer attempting to provide legal authority for the Transaction.*5
Coincidentally, Peck Shaffer also represented the City Council of
Gahanna as bond counsel in State ex rel. Ryan v. City Council of
Gahanna, where Gahanna was found to have unconstitutionally
issued bonds. The case set important legal precedent and mirrors the
(holding that street improvements to benefit two cul-de-sacs do not constitute a public
purpose under §13). But see State ex rel. Brown v. Beard, 48 Ohio St. 2d 290 (1976) (low-
income housing is not a public purpose within §13), overruled by State ex rel. Board of
County Commissioners v. Zupancic, 62 Ohio St. 3d 297, 299 (1991) (holding that low-
income housing is a public purpose within §13); Norton v. Limbach, 65 Ohio App. 3d 709
(1989) (§13 authorizes bonds issued for arbitrage investment).
261. Gold, supra note 7, at 457 (citing a telephone interview with Fred
Neuenschwander, former Ohio Director of Development).
262. Id.
263. Bond Resolution, Section 12-13.
264. Letter from Peck, Shaffer, & Williams LLP to Don L. Brown, County
Administrator, County of Franklin, Ohio (Nov. 14, 2011) (hereinafter "Peck Shaffer
letter"), attached as Exhibit B.
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Transaction in nearly all material legal respects."' The Peck Shaffer
letter does not cite Ryan despite its direct applicability to the
Transaction's constitutional issues.
Although the Peck Shaffer Letter is ambiguous in many respects,
not even identifying Ohio Const. Art. VIII §§4, 6 or 13, this section
will identify and refute the counterarguments as applied to the
relevant laws. I sent a response letter to the Franklin County
Commissioners explaining that Peck Shaffer has not provided a legal
basis for the Transaction, but the Commissioners did not reply. In
any event, this section will address the following arguments: (1) the
FCCFA is a public authority separate and apart from state and local
governments, which is not subject to Article VIII restrictions; (2)
Nationwide carries the risk of loss; (3) State, rather than local, taxes
are funding the bond issuance; (4) Bazell v. City of Cincinnati
provides constitutional authority for the Transaction; and (5) an
argument regarding subject-to-appropriation debt.
a. Public Authority Arguments
It may be argued that the FCCFA, as a separate entity from the
City of Columbus, Franklin County and the State of Ohio, may lend
its credit without lending government credit for constitutional
purposes. However, it is unlikely that the FCCFA effectively acts as a
shield in this manner. In Brand, a public commission separate from
the State of Ohio issued the loans in question, but nonetheless
violated the §§4,6 "lending of credit" restriction." The Brand Court
stated that lending of credit by the commission obviously constituted
lending of State credit due to the language of the enabling statute
under which the commission was created.26 7 Specifically, the enabling
statute states that the "commission is a body both corporate and
politic in this state, and the exercise by it of the powers conferred by
Sections 122.14 to 122.36, inclusive * * * is an essential governmental
function of the state."26 In identical fashion, R.C. 351, the statutory
authority pursuant to which the FCCFA was created, uses the same
language to describe the FCCFA.26 9 Thus, the FCCFA cannot act as a
265. State ex rel. Ryan v. City Council of Gahanna, 9 Ohio St. 3d 126, 459 N.E.2d 208
(1984) (section entitled "Counsel").
266. State ex rel. Saxbe v. Brand, 176 Ohio St. 44, 197 N.E.2d 328 (1964).
267. Id. at 48.
268. Id.
269. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §351.01(A); §351.02.
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shield or conduit to indirectly allow lending government credit under
§§4, 6.270
To be sure, the Ohio Supreme Court has condoned a narrowly
construed "special funds" doctrine, under which public bodies may
issue revenue debt that is not considered an obligation of the State.21
In Ohio, the special funds doctrine applies only in situations where
debt-financed projects produce income that is used to service the
debt.272 The special funds doctrine does not apply in situations where
tax revenue is used to service debt.273 Moreover, the doctrine applies
only to constitutional debt limits under Ohio Const. Art. VIII 01, 2
and 3, but not the lending of credit provisions under §§4, 6.274 In
270. Sterk & Goldman, supra note 9, at 1336 ("The Supreme Court has held that the
Ohio legislature may not empower a public authority to issue bonds for the purpose of re-
lending the borrowed money to promote economic development.") (citing Brand).
271. State ex rel. Shkurti v. Withrow, 32 Ohio St. 3d 424, 426-28 (1987); see also Sterk
& Goldman, supra note 9, at 1336-37.
272. Shkurti, 32 Ohio St. 3d at 426-28; State, ex rel. Pub. Institutional Bldg. Auth. v.
Neffner, 137 Ohio St. 390, 399 (1940).
Where substantial funds which have heretofore gone into the general
funds of the state treasury are pledged to liquidate such bonds,
thereby requiring the state to seek and secure revenues otherwise in
order to meet its obligations to care for and support its wards, then the
obligation of those bonds does become the ultimate obligation of the
state. To hold otherwise would result in an evasion of the
constitutional limitations.
Id.
273. Shkurti, 32 Ohio St. 3d at 428.
274. The Ohio Supreme Court has narrowly construed the special funds doctrine. In
two pre-Brand cases, the Court upheld revenue debt as non-obligations of the State
exempt from strict debt limits under OHIO CONST. art. VIII §1, 2, and 3. Kasch v. Miller,
104 Ohio St. 281, 288 (1922); State Bridge Comm'n v. Griffith, 136 Ohio St. 334 (1940).
But see State ex rel. Allen v. Ferguson, 155 Ohio St. 26 (1951) (citing Kasch and Griffith
for the proposition that the special funds doctrine applies to OHIO CONST. art. VIII, § 4).
In Ferguson, the Court could have refuted the Section 4 argument simply by recognizing
that the state was not lending its credit to a private corporation in that case. Gold, supra
note 7, at 443. Negating Ferguson as reliable authority, later cases have distinguished
doctrines under §§1, 2 and 3 from other provisions in Art. VIII. E.g. State ex rel.
Petroleum Underground Storage Tank Release Co., 62 Ohio St. 3d 111, 116 (1990)
(distinguishing the meaning of "tax" under §13 with its meaning under §1,2 and 3). Brand,
of course, makes clear that the special funds doctrine does not apply to Section 4. Brand,
176 Ohio St. at 50-51.
In view of the provisions of Sections 1, 2 and 3 of Article VIII, there
would appear to be no reason for the provisions of Section 4 of that
article against giving or lending the credit of the state if a giving or
Brand, the Court specifically rejected this line of cases as authority
for transactions that violate §4."
As a corollary to the public authority argument, it may be argued
that the §13 exception is applicable to uphold the Transaction
because the FCCFA acts as a shield. That is, it is not casino tax
revenue (i.e., moneys raised by taxation) used to repay the bonds, but
rather "rent' or lease payment revenues. However, the Ryan court
stated that it is simply the pledge of tax revenues by the political
subdivision that makes an act unconstitutional.276 Moreover, courts
should look to the "realities" of the transaction to determine whether
there is a corporate joint venture.277
In this case, Columbus and Franklin County are pledging casino
tax revenues to finance the Transaction. Specifically, Columbus and
Franklin County are pledging casino tax revenues to make lease
payments to the FCCFA,"' which is in turn pledging the lease
payments to repay bonds and fund the FCCFA Arena purchase.79 By
owning the Arena, the FCCFA is able to subsidize CBJ with rent-free
Arena usage under the Use Agreement.280 Thus, the FCCFA is acting
as a conduit because the funds pledged by Columbus, Franklin
lending of credit of the state would occur only where an indebtedness
of the state would be involved. In such an instance, the prohibition of
such giving or lending of the state's credit to an individual association
or corporation would certainly have been already prohibited by
Sections 1, 2 and 3 of that article.
Therefore, to give some meaning to the provisions of Section 4 of
Article VIII prohibiting the giving or loaning of the credit of the state,
we must conclude that those provisions prohibit a giving or loaning of
that credit even where no "debts" of the state, either "direct or
contingent" have been incurred.
Id. And Shkurti and Ryan, taken together, provide that the court should look to
substance over form in determining whether there is an issuance of debt or public-private
joint venture.
275. Brand, 176 Ohio St. at 50-51.
276. State ex rel. Ryan v. City Council of Gahanna, 9 Ohio St. 3d 129, 459 N.E.2d 208
(1984).
277. Id. at 128.
278. Lease Agreement, Section 1.01 (defining "Lessees Rent" as earmarked casino tax
receipts), Section 3.01 (defining Lease payments as Lessees Rent).
279. Bond Resolution, Section 1 (defining "Lessee's Rent" with reference to the Lease
Agreement), Section 12 and Section 13 (explaining the use of bond proceeds).
280. Use Agreement, Section 5.1 and Section 5.2 (explaining the "public purpose" for
the Transaction); see Use Agreement Article 5 and Article 6 (omitting a price or rent
term).
374 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 40:2
Winter 2013] NATIONWIDE ARENA AND OHIO'S FISCAL CONSTITUTION 375
County and the FCCFA are all the same funds and must be the same
funds, as they are earmarked under the terms of the City Ordinance
and FCCFA Bond Resolution."" In fact, the City Ordinance
recognizes that Columbus is now sharing in the cost of acquiring,
operating and maintaining the Arena.282 In sum, the Transaction does
not fall within the §13 exception merely because it incorporates a
public authority.
b. Government Entities Carry the Risk of Loss
The Peck Shaffer letter argues that Nationwide carries the risk of
loss for the Transaction because Nationwide, as bondholders, are
legally entitled only to casino tax revenue. If casino tax revenue does
not materialize, Nationwide does not have a legal claim to be repaid
for the FCCFA bonds it holds.
This argument is a red herring. "Risk of loss," as defined to
exclude below-market arrangements, is not a proxy for whether there
is a constitutional violation.283 As noted above, the below-market Use
Agreement is the lending of credit, as defined in Ryan and Brand,
that violates §§4, 6. The Peck Shaffer letter does not explain how the
risk of loss is relevant to the constitutional analysis. While this
section reiterates policy arguments stated above with an implicit
lending of credit legal argument, the reader should remember that
there is a constitutional violation independent from this analysis.
Against this backdrop, government entities do carry the risk of loss
from both a legal and policy perspective.
i. Government Entities Carry the Transaction's Risk of Loss
From a legal standpoint, government entities carry the risk of
loss because the Transaction ensures a guaranteed loss. Early Ohio
Supreme Court §4 cases taking risk of loss into account struck down
financing arrangements in part because the State, acting as a
financier, had assumed the risk of loss for the project.28 While
281. Bond Resolution, Section 12 and Section 13.
282. Columbus City Ordinance 1596-2011.
283. Peck Shaffer Letter, supra note 264, at 1 ("Nationwide will ... bear all the risk of
the sufficiency of the revenues pledged to the payment").
284. See, e.g., State ex rel. Campbell v. Cincinnati Street Railway Co., 97 Ohio St. 283
(1918). In Campbell, the Court invalidated bonds issued by a subway company operating
publicly owned street railways, which were to be repaid with gross receipts from that
company. Id. at 306-09. In part, the bonds would repay pre-existing company obligations.
Id. Because the bonds entitled the city to gross receipts from the company, the bonds lent
city credit by using government resources (i.e., the gross receipts) to repay existing
bearing risk of loss on the project in each case, the State employed
State property to provide financing in situations where there was an
arm's length transaction with a private entity.2 85
With the below-market Transaction at issue here, government
entities have incurred a guaranteed loss, which is a clearer violation
under §4, 6 than when government entities incur only a potential risk
of loss. The revenue stream from casino tax revenue has a present
value that could be converted into a lump sum at present." Even if
company obligations. Id. at 308-09. In other words, the government loaned its resources
to service debt obligations of a private company. See also City of Cincinnati v. Harth, 101
Ohio St. 344, 352 (1920) (invalidating a bond issuance enabling the government to repair
private railroads because "[tlhe city must pay the bonds whether the company pays the
money back to the city or not.").
285. Campbell, 97 Ohio St. at 307.
It is urged that the amount of compensation and the method of fixing
it is a matter for the determination of the city and its authorities in
negotiation with the company, and that it is not a subject of judicial
inquiry. Where the parties have full capacity to contract, this is true,
in the absence of fraud; and no fraud or bad faith is suggested in this
case.
Id. See also Harth, 101 Ohio St. at 349-50.
The only way provided by which the city is to be reimbursed is by
assessing against the company the cost of the things it gives to and
does for the company, in addition to the declaration of the statute that
the amount of the cost shall be a lien on the property of the company.
That is to say, it is a simple, plain loan by the city to the company of
the amount of money needed for the purpose. The company becomes
indebted to the city for the money the city has spent on the company's
property. The company gets the property at once. It may borrow on it
or sell it. The city has loaned its money and its credit to the company.
It is the very thing that the constitution prohibits.
Id. Notably, Campbell is not binding precedent requiring fraud for judicial inquiry into
whether public transactions are below-market arrangements; just as in Ryan the Ohio
Supreme Court did not find fraud but determined that there was an impermissible public-
private joint venture due to the favorable agreements with private businesses. Ryan, 1269
Ohio St. 3d at 129.
286. In a similar vein, the State of Ohio recently obtained a lump-sum payment from
bondholders by issuing bonds secured with payments tobacco companies are making in
settlement of litigation. Fitch Downgrades Ohio Tobacco Bonds; Official Says Budget Not
Impacted, Gongwer's Ohio Report (Feb. 10, 2012) ("The authority, set up by former Gov.
Ted Strickland's administration to securitize Ohio's stream of payments from the multi-
state settlement with Big Tobacco firms, sold the state's rights to the money through 2052
for about $5.5 billion-nearly all of which has already been spent on school facilities and
other programs.").
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casino tax revenue does not materialize to ultimately benefit CBJ,
government entities are incurring a loss because they are foregoing
the present value of the casino tax revenue. Thus, the Transaction is
not an arm's length transaction, but rather a below-market
Transaction imposing a loss on government entities.
Further, government entities receive little or no benefit from
assigning the casino tax revenue stream here because the Use
Agreement provides for CBJ to pay no rent. Any benefit in
stimulating the economy is too speculative to be legally significant
and, as discussed in Part III, has not been supported with any
evidence such as a basic return on investment calculation." In
assigning the casino tax revenue stream to the FCCFA for the
Transaction, Columbus and Franklin County are incurring a loss
because they are forgoing funds that they could realize at present and
receiving little or no benefit in return. The Transaction simply is not
an arm's length transaction.
ii. Section 13 Does Not Authorize Revenue Debt Tied to Tax Revenue
Peck Shaffer's revenue debt (i.e., risk of loss) argument also cuts
against its position that the Transaction is legal. Adopted in response
to Brand invalidating a debt issuance, §13 is designed to promote
public debt issuances for capital investment without affecting the
State taxing power.m8 The "moneys raised by taxation" limitation
under §13 promotes self-liquidating investments in capital projects
funded with non-tax revenues.
Despite §13 facilitating self-liquidating capital investment, the
Ohio Supreme Court's §13 jurisprudence encourages governmental
entities to pledge their full faith and credit (i.e., take on the risk of
loss) to fall within the §13 exception to §§4, 6.289 While §13 does not
permit debt issuances funded with moneys raised by taxation to fall
within its exception to §§4, 6, general obligation debt generally does
not constitute "moneys raised by taxation."" Revenue debt tied to
287. State ex rel. Ryan v. City Council of Gahanna, 9 Ohio St. 3d 126, 130, 459 N.E.2d
208 (1984) (refuting public purpose arguments in this context).
288. Gold, supra note 7, at 448-49, 456.
289. Id. at 454, 463-64.
290. Ryan, 9 Ohio St. 3d at 129 ("If only the full faith and credit of the city of Gahanna
had been pledged to repay the notes or bonds, this would have constituted sufficient
compliance with Section 13, Article VIII to allow this project to withstand a constitutional
challenge.") See also Gold, supra note 7, at 463-64.
tax revenue, on the other hand, does constitute "moneys raised by
taxation.""'
To structure the Transaction as constitutional, then, proponents
should be arguing that the debt issued is a State or municipal general
obligation pledging the full faith and credit of that government entity.
By contrast, Peck Shaffer and other Transaction proponents
structured the Transaction such that the revenue debt issued presents
no governmental general obligation.2 Instead, the revenue debt is
tied to tax revenue as the Ohio Constitution expressly prohibits. Peck
Shaffer's revenue debt argument therefore cuts against the
Transaction as constitutional and falling within §13. For this reason,
Peck Shaffer's failure to relate its analysis to the ultimate
constitutional issue matters and the letter highlights a key fact
necessary to find the Transaction unconstitutional-that the
Transaction creates revenue debt.
iii. For Practical Purposes, Government Entities Carry the Risk of Loss
As a matter of public policy, government leaders should expect
to repay bonds issued under the Transaction if casino tax revenue
provides insufficient funds."' On several occasions, government
officials and attorneys associated with the Transaction have stated
that there is no commitment to repay the debt arising from the
Transaction if casino tax revenue does not materialize as expected.29 4
Consistent with these statements, the Peck Shaffer letter makes the
same claim."' However, government entities will likely repay or
renegotiate debt even absent a legal obligation to do so in order to
maintain favorable credit ratings and appease individual creditors.29
If casino tax revenue does not materialize in this case, Columbus,
Franklin County and/or the State of Ohio will likely renegotiate the
291. Ryan, 9 Ohio St. 3d at 129.
292. See Ryan, 9 Ohio St. 3d at 129; Gold, supra note 7, at 463-64.
293. State ex rel. Saxbe v. Brand, 176 Ohio St. 44, 52, 197 N.E.2d 328 (1964) (stating
that revenue debt impacts the State's borrowing power even though indebtedness does not
arise).
294. Auditor Hugh Dorrian Oct. 3rd Columbus City Council Meeting. Caruso, supra
note 3. John Rosenberger, Oct. 18th Franklin County Convention Facilities Authority
Meeting.
295. Peck Shaffer Letter, supra note 264, at 1.
296. Brand, 176 Ohio St. at 52 (1964). See also Oesterle, supra note 9, at 613-14
(stating that "[tihe financial concept of debt does not depend on the revenue source for
the debt payment," but rather reflects the obligation to repay a fixed sum certain).
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Transaction to repay bonds issued under the Transaction or otherwise
appease Nationwide, even absent a legal obligation to do so.
In fact, the Transaction itself demonstrates Nationwide's
influence to renegotiate transactions. A Columbus School Board
member did not expect future property tax revenues from the
Nationwide Arena parcel because he expected, as in fact occurred,
Nationwide to renegotiate the existing property tax abatement for a
longer term." Due to Nationwide's influence, the presence of a
revenue stream (i.e., casino money) to service debt therefore does not
make debt distinct from a tax in this context because the public will
likely pay for the Arena even absent that revenue stream. Further,
the debt financing is a much less transparent use of public funds and
confers an obligation on future generations.298
In light of these legal and policy bases, the Transaction does not
place the risk of loss on Nationwide. Government leaders and
attorneys are referring to dubious legal technicalities when they state
that Nationwide assumes the risk of loss under the Transaction.
Similarly, a close reading of the Peck Shaffer letter suggests that bond
counsel may not have fully contemplated how the Ohio Constitution
treats revenue debt in this context or the policy reasoning behind the
law.29
c. Under §13, Casino Tax Revenue Constitutes "Moneys Raised by
Taxation"
The casino tax revenue pledged to repay bonds issued pursuant
to the Transaction constitutes "moneys raised by taxation" in
violation of §13. As an initial matter, casino tax revenue is
unquestionably a tax. Revenue that is identified expressly by
constitutional provision or statute as a tax is a tax under §13." Ohio
297. Bell, supra note 121.
298. Gillette, supra note 126, at 1247.
299. It is worth noting that the Transaction may not have been politically viable if
financed with general obligations bonds because then public officials would have had
greater difficulty asserting that the Transaction will not "increase taxes."
300. See 1994 Ohio Op. Att'y Gen. 353 No. 94-071, at 165.
However, the court's analysis in Duerk suggests that if moneys are not
specifically designated as tax moneys by statute or are not collected
pursuant to a statutory tax levy, and are not required to be paid into
the state treasury for the general expenses of state government, but
instead are required to be deposited into a special fund that is used
only for other specifically enumerated purposes, then the moneys do
not constitute "moneys raised by taxation."
Const. Art. XV §6 expressly identifies casino revenue as a tax, and in
doing so uses the word "tax" twenty-six times. Thus, casino tax is a
tax, and further, casino tax revenue constitutes "moneys raised by
taxation" under §13.
The Peck Shaffer letter argues that the casino tax is a state tax,
rather than a city or county tax."o' This distinction is not meaningful
other than to potentially create a §4 (i.e., state) violation rather than a
§6 (i.e., city or county) violation. Even if there were only a §4 (i.e.,
state) violation, by participating in the Transaction, Franklin County,
Columbus and the FCCFA are still parties to illegal contracts.
Moreover, there is a §13 violation regardless of which
governmental body (state, city, county or public authority) pledges a
tax to repay debt. The plain language of §13-"moneys raised by
taxation"-does not qualify the type of tax that violates §13.302
Nonetheless, without providing legal authority, the Peck Shaffer
letter states that casino tax revenue loses its character as a tax when
the State distributes it to other entities, including Columbus and
Franklin County.303
But debt issued pursuant to §13 should not affect any
governmental taxing power, including the government's "casino
taxing power" or any other taxing power. It stretches the bounds of
reason to argue, as Peck Shaffer does, that Ohio governmental bodies
may distribute tax revenue amongst one another to circumvent the
Ohio Constitution.
The intended purpose of §13 is also consistent with the plain and
unqualified reading of "taxation." Section 13 was designed to
promote public investment, but in doing so to protect the State taxing
power." In August 2012, shortly after closing on the Transaction,
Columbus enacted a new individual income tax on income derived
from games of chance, which includes not just casino gambling
income, but also income from longstanding church raffles and the
Id. (citing Duerk v. Donahey, 67 Ohio St. 2d 216 (1981)).
301. Peck Shaffer Letter, supra note 264, at 2-3.
302. Section 13, in pertinent part, reads as follows: "moneys raised by taxation shall
not be obligated or pledged for the payment of bonds or other obligations issued or
guarantees made pursuant to laws enacted under this section."
303. Peck Shaffer Letter, supra note 264, at 2-3.
304. Gold, supra note 7, at 448-49,456. See also State ex rel Pugh v. Sayre, 90 Ohio St.
215, 218 (1914) (citing Walker for the proposition that Section 6 is designed to protect
"revenues raised by taxation").
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existing state-run lottery.35 Despite statements by public officials
trumpeting the Transaction on the grounds that there would be no tax
increase, the City has enacted a new tax related to casino gambling.
Absent the Transaction, the city would have had additional casino tax
revenue that would have lessened or eliminated any need to generate
additional tax revenue related to casino gambling. In other words,
the Transaction affects the City's taxing power by giving rise to the
need for a new tax on casino gambling, which contravenes the
purpose of §13.
In addition, Franklin County and Columbus are likely to issue
other broadly based taxes, special assessments or user fees to replace
casino tax revenue foregone as a result of the Transaction." For
example, at the same meeting the Franklin County Commissioners
approved the Transaction, they raised resident sewer fees by 30%. '
Plainly, the Transaction pledges moneys raised by taxation in
violation of §13, as supported with policy-based considerations.
d. Bazell v. City of Cincinnati Provides No Constitutional Basis for the
Transaction.
Bazell v. City of Cincinnati provides no constitutional basis for
the Transaction. Bazell stands for the well-settled proposition that a
public body may lend its credit to another public body." In Bazell,
the Ohio Supreme Court did not consider whether a government
entity may lend its credit to a for-profit business under §6 nor did the
Court address §13 at all."' Instead, the Court considered whether,
305. City of Columbus Ordinance 1769-2012, http://columbus.legistar.com/Legislation
Detail.aspx?ID=1159729&GUID=8A5AA583-F704-42B6-9CD3-8B371AA8DOF7#.
UB7gXeM2g4s.email (last visited Oct. 5. 2012). See also Sullivan, supra note 117.
306. See Richard Briffault, The Disfavored Constitution: State Fiscal Limits and State
Constitutional Law, 34 RUTGERS L.J. 907, 932 (2003) ("The rise in these "non-tax taxes"
has had multiple policy, ideological, and political causes-but surely evasion of the tax
limits is one of them").
307. Lucas Sullivan, 30% water-sewer rate hike, purchase of arena OK'ed by
commissioners, THE COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Dec. 21, 2011, http://www.dispatch.com/
content/stories/local/2011/12/21/30-water-sewer-rate-hike-purchase-of-arena-okd.htmil.
Admittedly, other factors gave rise to the water-sewer rate hike, including the 41 million
gallons of water that Franklin County purchases from Columbus and cannot account for
each quarter. Id.
308. Bazell v. City of Cincinnati, 13 Ohio St. 2d 63, 72 (1968) ("This court has held that
these provisions do not prevent a county from raising money for or lending its credit to a
city ... or to a public organization such as an agricultural society organized to hold annual
agricultural fairs.") (citing State, ex rel. Speeth v. Carney, 163 Ohio St. 159 (1955)).
309. See id. at 65 (syllabus of the Court). The Court even cited State ex rel. Wilson v.
Hance, 169 Ohio St. 457, 159 N.E. 2d 741, (1959), which addresses the lending of
under §6, the City of Cincinnati may lend its credit to another
governmental entity, Hamilton County."'o In stating that a
municipality may construct a stadium for public use, the Court did so
in the context of a challenge under the municipal home rule in which
the plaintiffs contended that the charter municipality exceeded the
powers granted to it, not in the context of §§4, 6 and 13.2" Further,
the Court expressly noted that it was only considering the errors
identified in the record.3 " Thus, Bazell does not address the
constitutional issues that the Transaction presents and cannot provide
legal authority for the Transaction.
Even if Bazell had addressed the relevant constitutional issues,
the Transaction is clearly distinguishable from the structure of the
financing plan in Bazell because: (1) the Transaction's below-market
Use Agreement lends public credit to a for-profit business in violation
of §§4, 6; and (2) the Transaction pledges moneys raised by taxation
in violation of §13.'
government credit to a private corporation under §6, to distinguish the issue at bar from
the public-private context. Id. at 72.
310. Id. at 71-72.
311. Id. at 67-68 (citing OHIO CONST. art. XVIII §§ 3, 7). The municipal home rule is
clearly distinct and subject to different legal analysis from Ohio Const. art. VIII §§4, 6.
See Campbell, 97 Ohio St. at 304 ("By the provisions of Sections 4 and 5 of Article XVIII
plenary power is given to the municipality to deal with the subject. However, these
sections of Article XVIII must be construed with Section 6 of Article VIII, which, as
already stated, was readopted at the same time. They are entirely consistent and full
effect must be given to all of them.").
312. Id. at 74-75 (citing R.C. § 2505.21).
313. The Bazell transaction was structured as follows:
Hamilton County is to issue... revenue bonds due serially over a
period of 40 years to provide money needed for acquisition of the site
and for construction of the stadium project; the city is to convey this
site to the county; the county is to pay the city from the proceeds of
those bonds money for construction of the stadium project; the city is
to arrange for construction of that project; the county is to lease the
stadium project to the city for 40 years; the city obligates itself under
that lease and the co-operative agreement with the county to pay rent
in each year to the county in an amount sufficient to enable the county
to pay interest and principal on the bonds that will be due in that year;
the county is to have no obligation on its revenue bonds other than to
use the rent received from the city to pay that interest and principal;
and that rent is to be the only source for payment of that interest and
principal.
Id. at 72-73.
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First, the Transaction violates §§4, 6 by lending public credit to
or creating a corporate joint venture with a for-profit business.
Lending among public bodies is distinct from lending credit from
government entities to a for-profit business. The Transaction lends
public credit (e.g. the FCCFA and other public entities) to a for-profit
business (CBJ) by means of a below-market Use Agreement. In
Bazell, the City of Cincinnati lent its credit to Hamilton County,
which is lending of credit among two governmental entities. The
Court's opinion does not provide a sufficient basis to determine
whether there was a constitutional violation had the Court considered
whether the City of Cincinnati lent its credit to the Cincinnati Reds.
Further, there is no indication that there was a below-market lease or
use agreement in Bazell as there is with the Transaction. Thus, the
Transaction presents a violation under §§4, 6 that was not present in
Bazell.
Second, the Transaction pledges moneys raised by taxation in
violation of §13. Under §13, moneys raised by taxation may not be
pledged to service debt otherwise falling within §13. The Transaction
pledges casino tax revenue as Columbus' lease payment under its
FCCFA Lease, which is then pledged to repay the bond issue. In
Bazell, the private rents generated from stadium operation were paid
to Cincinnati, which pledged that revenue to Hamilton County to
service the debt issuance that financed the stadium. The private rents
are not tax revenue, whereas casino tax revenue is tax revenue.
Further, the Court specifically stated that the use of tax revenue to
service the bonds was too speculative based upon the record before
it.314 Thus, the Transaction presents a §13 violation that was not
present in Bazell. For all of the foregoing reasons, Bazell does not
provide a constitutional basis for the Transaction.
e. Subject-to-Appropriation Debt
The subject-to-appropriation debt argument in the Peck Shaffer
letter is another red herring argument. Under Ohio Const. Art. XII
§§2, 11, there are additional limitations on public indebtedness and a
sinking fund requirement separate from Ohio Const. Art. VIII, §§ 4,6
314. The Bazell Court determined that it was too speculative, based upon the record
before them, that tax revenue would be used to service the bonds. Id. at 67. By contrast,
the Nationwide Arena Transaction clearly uses "casino tax revenue," as defined in OHIO
CONST. art. XV § 6.
and 13.'" Peck Shaffer notes that the "rental payments" pursuant to
the circular Lease and Sublease are subject to annual appropriation.'
Due to the annual appropriation, Peck Shaffer argues that bonds
issued in the Transaction do not constitute "indebtedness" or violate
debt restrictions under Ohio Const. Art. XII, §§ 2, 11.2" But this
argument does not address the constitutional provisions that the
Transaction violates-Ohio Const. Art. VIII §§4, 6, and 13-
regarding lending of aid or credit. Thus, the subject-to-appropriation
argument, which constitutes a substantial portion of the Peck Shaffer
letter, does not provide a constitutional basis for the Transaction.
V. Conclusion: The Future for Ohio's Fiscal Constitution
The Nationwide Arena Transaction's poorly justified economic
development purpose and constitutional violation demonstrates that
Ohio's fiscal constitution is not properly functioning to limit the
impact that individual economic and political incentives have on
public finances. The Transaction specifically raises substantive policy
and enforcement issues.
First, the Transaction violates Ohio's constitutional fiscal
restraints, but the policy debate surrounding the Transaction also
identifies potential areas for reform. As noted in Parts III and IV
above, principles of public debt warrant debt issuances to voluntarily
transfer private funds to the public sector in limited amounts, as well
as to facilitate capital formation for self-liquidating capital
investment.' Indeed, the Ohio Constitution has a provision-Ohio
Const. Art. VIII §§1, 2-authorizing debt transfers in limited
amounts.:' But §13 goes beyond that purpose to also exempt all debt
issuances made pursuant to §13 from restrictions on public
investment in the private sector, i.e., §§4, 6.
Ohio's debt limits, including §13 authorizing debt for a public
purpose, should be separated from its restrictions on lending
government credit to the private sector. At a minimum, §13's
authorization for debt issued to fund self-liquidating capital
315. State ex rel. Kitchen v. Christman, 31 Ohio St. 2d 64, 73-75 (1972) (discussing
Ohio Const. art. XII § 11).
316. Peck Shaffer Letter, supra note 264, at 2.
317. Id.
318. BUCHANAN, supra note 107, at 2.12.35.
319. See OHIO CONST. art. VIII §2. Note that §2 authorizes debt issuances for
particular purposes that go beyond the transfer function in some instances. Section 2p, for
example, authorizes economic development through Ohio's Third Frontier Program.
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investment should remove the exception to §§ 4, 6.320 The Keynesian
economic theory that may have justified §13's adoption in 1965 is
highly questionable following U.S. stagflation in the 1970's.3"
As the Ohio Supreme Court did in Brand, debt limits and
restrictions on public investment in the private sector should be
analyzed separately.322 Further, if §13's exception to §§4, 6 is
removed, politicians will carry the burden to justify public debt
issuances for non-income producing capital investment, and §§4, 6
will have greater meaning to restrict public investment in for-profit
businesses.
Second, and more prominent, Columbus' experience with the
Transaction demonstrates difficulty enforcing constitutional fiscal
restraints.2 As noted in Part II, procedure plays at least some role in
determining the public good. The Ohio Constitution, for example,
provides rules relating to public debt issuances for capital investment
and restrictions on public investment in the private sector. However,
320. In the context of Ohio constitutional debt limits separate from §§4, 6, the Ohio
Supreme Court has refused to expand Ohio's special fund doctrine relating to income-
producing property. See Shkurti, 32 Ohio St. 3d at 426-27.
We first note that in Griffith and Kasch and the subsequent cases
approving the special fund exception, the bonds to be issued were to
finance construction of a tangible, income-producing property whose
income was then pledged to retire the bonds. In the instant case, no
such property is constructed or acquired. Rather, an outstanding
liability is refunded. Since no property is constructed or acquired,
there is no income from the property to pay debt service. Instead, a
"surcharge" on current employer contributions is created (R.C.
4141.251) and pledged (R.C. 4141.48[C1 and [Q1) to retire the bonds.
While this proposed transaction parallels the special fund exception
previously sanctioned by this court, it does not fall within the limits of
that exception; rather, it is a significant extension of that exception.
Id. Notably, Ohio courts have stated that §13 can authorize debt otherwise prohibited
under §§4, 6. E.g., State ex rel. Eichenberger v. Neff, 42 Ohio App. 2d 69, 77, 330 N.E.2d
454 (1974) (holding that constitutional authority under §13 moots a potential §4 issue).
321. BUCHANAN & WAGNER, supra note 26, at 8.11.11-8.11.19; Friedman, supra note
139, at 468-71 (noting that stagflation in the 1970's provides empirical evidence that there
is not a trade-off between inflation and unemployment); Mark Kelman, Could Lawyers
Stop Recessions? Speculations on Law and Macroeconomics, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1215,1237-
39 (1993) (questioning the soundness of Keynesian economic theory with reference to
stagflation in the 1970s).
322. State ex rel. Saxbe v. Brand, 176 Ohio St. 44, 48-49 (§4 analysis), 50-51
(indebtedness discussion), 197 N.E.2d 328 (1964).
323. See BRENNAN & BUCHANAN, supra note 5, at 9.1.30-9.1.33 ("The Enforceability
of Constitutional Contract").
these fundamental laws that represent the state government's
contract directly with its citizens and that limit government powers in
order to protect individual rights are without effect if they are not
respected and enforced. Exacerbating the enforcement issue are non-
transparent and complicated financial arrangements, implemented
through lawyers, which are designed to circumvent constitutional
purposes.
Columbus City Council, Mayor Michael Coleman, the Franklin
County Commissioners and the Franklin County Convention
Facilities Authority unanimously approved the Transaction without
giving serious consideration to return on investment or whether the
Transaction was legal. That is, the Nationwide Arena Transaction
violates directives from the people through the Ohio Constitution and
has been shown here to be a poor investment. In other words, public
officials have not followed the rules to determine the public good.
Highlighting the enforcement issue, which this article leaves
unresolved, are my largely ignored public efforts to alert public
officials to legitimate and serious concerns with the Transaction. As
of this writing, no lawsuits have been filed to stop the Transaction
despite statutes providing for taxpayer standing against municipalities
(e.g., City of Columbus) and counties (e.g., Franklin County).324
Without enforcement, the Transaction and other public finance
arrangements in Ohio need not even technically comply with the
Ohio Constitution, much less comport with the constitutional
purpose. This circumstance creates a formidable quandary, one I
plan to address in a future article examining processes for fiscal
constitutional reform in Ohio.
324. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 733.59, 733.60 (West 2012) (providing for taxpayer
standing against a municipality and a one year statute of limitations on such suits); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. §309.13 (West 2012) (providing for taxpayer standing against a county).
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EXHIBIT A
City of Columbus and
Franklin County
Lease (transferring Arena Sublease (returning Arena &
& Real Estate to the City Real Estate to FCCFA for
and County for casino tax nominal sum)
revenue)
S10M in Bonds"'
State of I , C
Ohio $10M I
Use of Nationwide Arena
Columbus
Blue Jackets
CBJ pays no rent
325. The bonds are serviced with casino tax revenue. Bond Resolution, Section 12,
Section 13.






Consioe se amwasm Bri Commssioner Paula tooks Cownashmer ask O'Graly
Dave Ebasole, 1.D.
Michael E. Modtz College of Law
The Ohio State University
Re Nationwide Arena Transaction Working Paper
Dear Mr. Ebersel:
Thank you for your clear interest in the publi-private partnership to purchase
Nationwide Arena Your thoughtfat response raises sonte important points-pokes which
members of the steeng cnune and other conummity leaders have taken great wca to
consider as they evauate the d ptc hepaOm
in response to the issues raised in your workingpaper, I have atached the opinion of th
FCCPA's highly qoalified and experiened bond coumeL Pek Shaffer. When considering the
Nationwide Arena Mnsaction, the County will rely on this advice as well as the advice of the
County Prosecuting Attorney.
Addtionally, the Cowy wiS consider the econmic itact of the transaction. The
proposed plan aimr to protect 10.000)obs ad ensure the ame continues to produe busineas and
out revenues essential for the provislon of other Coanty services. These economic benefhs have
been estimated and analyzed by the neering connitee members proposing the plan, as well as
in a recent eport completed by the Jont Glen School of POblic AffAirs at The Ohio State
Uiversity, The County will take these poctions under advisement when considering the
proposed trasection, possibly in eaty December.
it is my hope hat this infoanation and the atached letter adequately addmas each Ot your
conces. Again I thank you for year attention to this matter. Please let me know if you would
like to discuss further.
an se.Ah seek st th as ft ws, ooisasts
absTO nan 81sens99e www<seonspa oeo
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r SNAFFER aweaau
November 14,2011
Don L Brown, County Administrator
Cotyof Fruklin, Ohio
373 South High Stal. 26th floor
Colunms, OH 412154314
Dear Mr. Brown*
You have requested us to briefly respond to inquiries rearding the lepl basis for tbe
Nationwide Arnatansaction involving the County of Faklin, the City ofColtatua and the
Franklin County Convention Facilides Aulbority. In particular, you have asked as t confirm
that in this transaction, there is aojoint venue, no kading ofaid and edit, no lease to a private
tadness and no general ob~ption debt suprted by taxes. We hereby confir that to be the
0e.
Ouanelysis begins with the ct " the FranliaCotunty Convention Facilities
Authoity (the PCCFA) has the explicit power under Chapter 351, Ohio Revised Code, to
purchase an arena and to issue revenue boads to fSaunce a portion of that purchane U FCCFA
proposes to purehaseNstonwide's irerestia the arena for 425 milon. That faility cost 5165
million to build approximately It years ago. Nationwide willbe paid with cash derived from a
State of Ohlo loan to the FCCFA and with reveauo bonds (essenaly apremissory note payable
fios specied revenues) issued by the FCCPA. Nationwide will be the bondholder, wtl be p-id
interest and principal over ie to tae the FCCFA bonds and, importantly. will bear all the risk
of the Suficiency of the revenues pledged to the payment.
The bonds will be revenue bonds ofthC FFA and the FCCFA only, and will not be
general obliations of the FCCFA the Cityof Cotumbusor the Cunty ofFmldin. There will
be vo pledge of the Whi faith and credit of the FCCFA, the City or the Couny. No taxe levied or
collected by the PCCFA, the Cky or the County will be pledged to thO psyment of the bonds,
The Blue Jackets will have no property Interest in theenaw frusiad, the aren will be a
public facility owned by the FCCFA. The PCCFA will mnake arena fcilities available for
une by non-profit and for-profit users, including concert and event promoters, civi and
educational institutions, child and adult sports teams. religious orniations, and other groups
seeking the use ofarena and convention facilities. One ofthose users will be the Blue Jackets,
pwsuant to a negotiated ma agreemet for the use of potions ofthe facility during speciaed
tunes in echange for coaritments fom the Blae Jackets.
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Don L Shown, Coanty A&denastato
Nomanber 14, 2011
?pV2
ft is longe ied law that a county a con vemdon ftda esleyma y own amd
opeete a sadhnm or ena a may ao *d tht toly topdv usm So br eampt4 pmsphib
tesofhesksof Basil.Cnda l ) I Obl St20'63 ("A dranWOMlpWlity
may constructa sdm that d isd to wonn e p aow a athtles md oie
abbideoa s a may ent det utadle a priva possons. will pvide suchaibinvead
sc Inunicipiles may do so eve 6ouh suc pito asoswldepmwu ~ is. t Roe
proiding those cahlbti ns...."). Sipiscay la l s ase Ampcdupoed by toesoof
the ms by plvals CAls so sot pledged to 6o p oaf t fbCCFAbond In oer
word, the payme ofdie pCCFA's bonds a odpendat pne mose oftbe Jw acta
or any ib rer of aM na, slow e vmeues wil not be uAi Ar or pl~dged bthed
rsywmt ofthbods.
The only PCCPA aevnmes plge to the bondAoldes an the senal psymaels eadwvd
by he FCCA puansat to the lasbIbeem ofthe fdIlty to the City mad to CoWty. Thew
ratal paymensawil be In na mont qual to a spedted pasentage ofthe ason evenm
received by de City sad th County Bam te Stansof Obl. Ti obligadoes ow City ad the
County toma.c atl pwapat*st aent to aual appropdadon. As ascAult, thm
ssatoss are notV*ee or indeteene omfie City or de Cousy weihn do meagof to
dae limitiononalled in Article ll, 2 mt Article XII, II of the Ol CoWlnstitd Ses
for sumpt Stan a il. Ram v. (1916) 93 0 414 (wns madeby indumita
onaisdion sebuet to approphimiwas not det). Coeumlm blaipdons inciuding lmes
onptiem. e"h m b t staando approprunondoo tst m tAt d bowas ceeding
lgisladvo bodine ae not legalty obiasted to appoprie money fbrt s apent of such
obligaio Smuc Mrd, Y, (1960)170 Ohio St. 450 (satute ad egraenmt
did ot create a dbt ofthe Smewh appropration ded a ap port th Oeginal agreeO
and enewals dtaeetaud whee sabequent Ocoeral Assemblies am to bound)
Pdor bond is of te FCCFA which hided in thir trutue stalle east ovolving
to Chy and the Coady have been valdsed. See for caample ot ecatly. TheEa
CtranvadenandtI~l.~ppiidae~te ~aRimar an NoN . 09Cvm1 733 Cow of
Camnon Pnes Faktiu Coanly. Ohio (Aous 2s8 2009). No conjeeonwaPrdie wherber the
City or the County will make an aal appropiam is slevast in the legal analyls) of whethar
to obligatioso of th City mad Couny under the lease an debt
The us by the City ad the CoMnyofoportion of their spected eve mo OteoemAna
ten seemsto beamsomeofonfblon, Theeasiw tisooituz lovied mndooacted bytde
FCCPA, the City orte County. See newly enacted biO Constituion Artide XV 6. Ilstea4 it
isacharge levied and coleeted by tboState against goss casin sevenead it Is paidby de
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Pear.MIAFFata WUMMUP
Don L BroCouty Adlttrator
Novembe 14,2011
asiooope se s ac nit ballowedto moe a t San ena
produd bdwed stom a sio opeatg in t Stao . Thom pooled sesasate
diglaisbtd acan5n toe ao f au t (tsi Ib that $6 to al cunies and all publehool
distrie in the State, a wall ast a s itie naluedes, the StE r waing Commission,
lh. C OsinC C nomdacsio, a law a*reemet fad and a ganblsAting b AL
Even iftde Stues Caubi svenes ms characlt as aing beu eigmilydved
fom Stn leviedby the Sac phaymnts by ts StUe t eftsevenmus loses h mE umer
tpan se*cept by abe dueand moatlsn Por ample, mnito tes lovied by a city ormaaly.
them we no ewsultionkposed on 1to sn able Stt eaia revenues by On City or lhe
Coamsy, as herthan of coursethatthemusbe for opubile me. In addhio.alikepopwtymo
odWor 4mes, fes or cbWhps hposed by te City ort Co ay, the City and o County bsses
ability to loem o decas the amomst of asino revenounceived by tiem That i soley a
finction of malcs reached by the Stae hensthe casino emators. bprtanly. ao
govanttm al am ofeither the City or tbc County wil be *ooted shouk th casho
revenuss the City aid the County iend to us as mel paymeans bless than antiipaed he
iskdo1sia0 seveWn being h s Pjected and, as mlt, te rental payments beng te
that anticpatd, b a risk taken by the bondholder (adenwd.), inot the City, te County or de
FCCFA.
We traM this ncplanln ha bean bepfa in adling te legal basis dbrth arena
tawsaon. Please ksas kw iffwea beofitthersuvice.
Vey ouly yon
PECK, S1AWSl & WUAMS LP
MaWyS. Dufey
usolake
392 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 40:2
